(source: ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu/WWII_L)
Date:    Mon, 4 Mar 1996 20:34:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Guadalcanal Air War - Intro

Guadalcanal: Island in British Solomon Islands, West Pacific Ocean
at 09-30S, 160-00E about 300 miles (483 km) SE of Bougainville
Island, 100 miles (160 km) SE of New Georgia Island, and about 35
miles (56 km) SW of Malaita Island; 2,180 sq mi (5,648 sq km); 92
mi (148 km) long and 33 mi (53 km) wide at its widest part; has no
good harbors and only a few at all usable; traversed lengthwise by
Kavo Mountains; highest peak Popomanasiu 7,648 ft (2,331 m); many
short streams are along the coast, the best known the Mataniko,
Lunga and Tenaru rivers in the North.

Guadalcanal and Tulagi Islands were invaded by the 1st Marine
Division, reinforced, on 7 Aug 42, the first U.S. offensive
operation of World War II.  For the first two months, the ground
war was essentially a Marine show; the Army started landing troops
in Oct 42.  The air war was entirely different.  From the
beginning, the air war was fought by Army, Navy and Marine aircrews
flying from Henderson Field.

During the war, the Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence, Headquarters, US Army Air Forces (USAAF) published a
50+ page pamphlet entitled PACIFIC COUNTERBLOW, THE 11TH
BOMBARDMENT GROUP AND THE 67TH FIGHTER SQUADRON IN THE BATTLE FOR
GUADALCANAL.  Although intended to relate the story of these two
USAAF units, this pamphlet also tells of the miserable and
hazardous conditions faced by all on Guadalcanal.  I have scanned
this document in and edited it by adding additional data to clarify
locations, units, etc.

Because of it's size (>120K bytes), I have divided this material
into six different posts.  Remember, this was written during the
war while a lot of material was classified; I am sure that much
material has become available since then so don't be too critical.
I hope you enjoy it and I am sure the list welcomes all comments.

Date:    Mon, 4 Mar 1996 20:35:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Guadalcanal Air War 1/6

PACIFIC COUNTERBLOW

NOTE:  The ranks of officers mentioned in this booklet are those which
they held at the time of the events described herein.

THE SOUTH PACIFIC, SUMMER 1942

Pearl Harbor secured for the Japanese the initiative in the Pacific.
They chose first to strike southward.  By March 1942 the Netherlands
East Indies, and with them any opportunity of reinforcing the
Philippines, had largely disappeared in the maw of Nippon's war machine.
March and April a successful but less precipitate foe devoted to the
initial digestion of his gains and the extension of his forces along the
flanks of Australia.  Already Australian security had thus become the
first charge of U. S. forces in the South Pacific, and defense of
Australia meant defense of the last remaining reinforcement route to the
subcontinent-the 7,000 miles (11,265 km) of island-studded Pacific seas
lying between San Francisco and Sydney.

Twice more the enemy moved offensively.  A thrust in early May against
either Port Moresby, New Guinea, or the Free French isle of New
Caledonia, bastion of the supply route from the United States, was
smashed in the Coral Sea.  And after 6 Jun 42, with its ambitious
two-pronged offensive against Midway Island and the Aleutian Islands
crushed at Midway Island, the Japanese fleet retired westward to lick
its wounds.  For the first time in the Pacific war, America possessed
the initiative - a limited, precarious initiative, demanding the
earliest possible exploitation.

How this initiative was employed is the history of the operation against
Guadalcanal and Tulagi Islands in the Solomon Islands. Primarily it was
an operation to safeguard Australia's supply line, threatened first from
Rabaul on New Britain Island, secured by the enemy in Jan 42; then from
Tulagi Island, where by May 42 the Japanese were already well
established. (It was at Tulagi Island that the USS Yorktown's (CV-5)
aircraft carried out a successful strike during the Battle of the Coral
Sea.)

In Jun 42 grass was burning on Guadalcanal's Lunga Plain, one of the few
spots in the Solomon Islands where an airdrome could easily be built.
Around 4 Jul 42, Japanese troops and construction personnel moved ashore
and in less than a month Allied search planes saw the first signs of
what appeared to be a concrete runway.

The Tulagi Island-Lunga Plain, Guadalcanal combination was extremely
convenient.  Enclosed by the small islands of Tulagi, Gavutu, and
Tanambogo, the harbor on Tulagi Island is deep and spacious; with air
cover from Guadalcanal it presents an excellent naval base site.
Backing this advanced base were Rabaul on New Britain Island, only 565
nautical miles (1,046 km) distant; Bougainville Island, with the
important complex consisting of Buin and Tonolei on Bougainville and
Faisi on Shortland Island, protected from Kahili Field, at
Bougainville's southern tip; and Kieta on Bougainville where an airdrome
was already being laid out-an impressive array of supporting bases.  And
from many lesser bases in the Solomon Islands-from Gizo Island; Rekata
Bay on Santa Isabel Island; Kieta, Bougainville Island; and Buka Passage
between Buka and Bougainville Islands-seaplanes were already operating.

With Lunga Airdrome on Guadalcanal complete, land-based bombers would be
able to soften the New Hebrides Islands for a thrust southward.  If the
Japanese were to be stopped short of a point where they could snap the
lifeline to Australia, then Tulagi-Guadalcanal Islands offered the last
possible opportunity.

The man facing this problem was Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley,
Commander, South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC).  As COMSOPAC, Admiral Ghormley
commanded all U. S. ground, air, and naval forces in his area, and
certain New Zealand units as well.  His air commander was Rear Admiral
John S. McCain, who, as Commander Aircraft South Pacific Forces
(COMAIRSOPAC), controlled all land-based aircraft in the South Pacific
Area, including those of the US Army Air Forces (USAAF).

GENERAL HARMON TAKES OVER

Top Army commander in the South Pacific was Major General Millard F.
Harmon, who arrived in the theater to assume the title of Commanding
General of US Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (COMGENSOPAC), only
a week before the Guadalcanal offensive opened.  Subordinate to
COMSOPAC, General Harmon was charged with the training and
administration of all U. S. Army ground and air force troops in the
South Pacific.  His advent clarified the supply and administration of
the string of island bases and lessened any possibility of Army units
disintegrating organically under local Navy, Marine, or New Zealand
control.

General Harmon had stepped directly from the post of Chief of the Air
Staff.  Moreover, the small staff which flew down with him to Noumea
on New Caledonia Island in the last week of Jul 42 numbered such
officers as Brigadier General Nathan F. Twining, future commander of the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Air Forces (and Chief of Staff of the US Air
Force, Jun 53 to Jun 57); Lieutenant Colonel Dean C. Strother, future
commander of the XIII Fighter Command; and Colonel Frank Everest.  If
Admiral McCain retained operational control of Air Corps units, he
recognized that the wide dispersion and dissimilar composition of his
air establishment made it impracticable to exercise his command
directly.  Training and a certain amount of tactical discretion remained
to COMGENSOPAC and his subordinate commanders. In Jul 42 the USAAF were
mainly represented in the forward area by the 11th Bombardment Group
(Heavy) consisting of the 26th, 42d, 98th and 431st Bombardment
Squadrons (Heavy) and the 67th Fighter Squadron, 58th Fighter Group.
The other three squadrons of the 58th Fighter Group were:

 - 68th Fighter Squadron on Tongatubu Island, Tonga Islands;
 - 69th Fighter Squadron at Sarasota AAFld, Florida; and
 - 70th Fighter Squadron at Dale Mabry Field, Tallahassee, Florida.

The 11th Bombardment Group (Heavy) disposed of 27 Boeing B-17E Flying
Fortresses on New Caledonia Island and 8 in the Fiji Islands.  The 67th
Fighter Squadron mustered 38 Bell P-39D and P-400 Airacobras, all on
New Caledonia Island.  The P-400, to quote the men who flew it, was "a
cheap version of the early P-39's."  Additionally, there were on New
Caledonia Island 10 Martin B-26B Marauders of the 69th Bombardment
Squadron (Medium), 38th Bombardment Group (Medium) with a dozen more of
the 70th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) in the Fiji Islands.

THE 11TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (HEAVY) AND THE LANDING IN THE SOLOMON
ISLANDS

Despite the fact that a workable basis for Army-Navy cooperation had
been reached at a time when the Jun victory at Midway Island made it
possible to mount an initial offensive against the Japanese, the
remainder of 1942 loomed precariously for the Allies in the South
Pacific.  The Midway Island battle had only approximately restored the
balance of fleet power.  Shipping was extremely short.  Only the 1st
Marine Division, reinforced, could be spared for the assault on
Guadalcanal.  General Harmon found himself in command of units
originally sent posthaste in early 1942 to garrison the stepping stones
to Australia, units largely tied down to a defense for which they were
scarcely adequate.

Nevertheless, preparations for the blow against the Guadalcanal area
went forward.  As early as Apr 42 Tulagi Island had been designated the
number one American objective in the Solomon Islands.  The Marines began
Aug 42, then for as near that date as practicable.  Arrangements were
completed whereby General MacArthur's aircraft would search and bomb in
the northern Solomon Islands and strike the airdromes at Lae and
Salamaua, New Guinea.

The final week in Jul 42 saw the initial B-17's of the 11th Bombardment
Group (Heavy) arrive in the South Pacific, the first squadron landing
during a driving rainstorm at Plaines des Gaiacs Airdrome on New
Caledonia Island.  The 11th had been based in Hawaii, was a veteran of
Caledonia Island.  Now, under the leadership of Colonel Laverne G.
Saunders, it was to participate in the assault on Guadalcanal.

The USAAF, seeking to give air striking forces a mobility analogous to
that of major naval units, had initially distrusted committing heavy
bombers to fixed assignments in the islands.  The area was described as
"linear in type and of limited depth."  Its defense, it was thought,
could be accomplished more economically by holding major air striking
forces at the extremities, and providing bases and logistical services
for their rapid concentration against a threat to intermediate points.
Originally this concept envisaged stationing heavy bombers only in
Hawaii and Australia.  However, in Jul 42 the 11th Bombardment Group
(Heavy) was ordered to New Caledonia as the Mobile Force, Central
Pacific, and below in Australia the 19th Bombardment Group (Heavy) was
named the Mobile Force in the Southwest Pacific.

[NOTE: In the early stages of the battle for Guadalcanal the USAAF was
represented by the 11th Bombardment Group (Heavy) and the 67th Fighter
Squadron. Later the 11th was joined by squadrons of the 5th Bombardment
Group (Heavy), and still later, replaced by the 307th Bombardment Group
(Heavy).  Various other fighter squadrons stationed in rear areas, such
as the 12th, 44th, 68th, 70th, and 339th Fighter Squadrons, all
eventually contributed detachments or moved up to the island as did the
69th and 70th Bombardment Squadrons (Medium).  As the subtitle implies,
this narrative is concerned primarily with the activities of the 67th
Fighter Squadron and the 11th Bombardment Group (Heavy).  Thus the
actions of the 19th Bombardment Group (Heavy), located at Port Moresby,
New Guinea, which were coordinated with the initial attack and
subsequent actions on Guadalcanal, are not detailed here and deserve a
separate narrative.]

Four days after the new designation, the squadrons of the 11th
Bombardment Group (Heavy) left Hickam Field, Hawaii, the 98th and 42d
arriving at Plaines des Gaiacs on 21 and 23 Jul, respectively.  On 24
Jul, the 431st landed at Nandi in the Fijis and the following day the
pilots of the 26th set down their planes on Efate Island, New Hebrides
Island.  It had been planned to base one squadron each at Plaines des
Gaiacs, Koumac--also on New Caledonia-Nandi, and Efate Island, and
advance these when practicable to the new base under construction on
Espiritu Santo Island.

Lying directly in the path of a possible thrust from the Solomon
Islands, Espiritu Santo Island had been a sort of no man's land.
Admiral McCain, perceiving the value of the position to the contemplated
seizure of Tulagi Island, had immediately upon his arrival in the
theater in May requested that troops be sent in and an airfield
constructed.  The troops were sent but construction of the airdrome was
not approved.  Nevertheless, COMAIRSOPAC surveyed a site, built a road
to it, and confidently awaited orders to complete the project; the
orders came in Jul.  All available troops pitched in and in 16 days an
airstrip 5,000 by 200 feet (1,524 by 61 m) was hacked out.  On 30 Jul,
Major Allen J. Stewart of the 11th Bomb Group 26th Bomb Squadron set down
the first B-17E on the new strip.

PRE-ASSAULT OPERATIONS

For the Guadalcanal operation, Admiral McCain divided his shorebased
planes into task groups.  The 11th Bomb Group constituted the second
task group, responsible for daily search of the southern Solomon Islands
and their western waters, for tracking important enemy contacts, and for
execution of air attacks as directed.  The dual role of search and
bombing assigned the B-17E's by COMAIRSOPAC's operations orders had been
foreshadowed by his policy of placing the B-17's, together with the Navy
patrol bombers, under both Air Patrol and Bomber Commands at South
Pacific air bases.  The great areas of the Pacific, shielding a powerful
and aggressive enemy fleet, made search a prime necessity.

With its service crews still at sea, the 11th Bomb Group nevertheless
tackled vital photo work almost on arrival, flying photographic missions
over the Tulagi-Guadalcanal-Gavutu Islands area on 23 and 25 Jul and
getting its first taste of local fighter opposition when Nakajima
A6M2-N, Navy Type 2 Fighter Seaplanes (Rufe's) ineffectively intercepted
both missions.  During the very few days remaining before the departure
of the Marines for Guadalcanal, strenuous efforts were made to procure
information on Japanese positions.  Major General Alexander A.
Vandegrift, commanding the 1st Marine Division, was experiencing a
woeful lack of photos, and Navy charts were badly out of date.  In an
effort to remedy this situation the 435th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy)
of the 19th Bombardment Group (Heavy) during Jun and Jul 42 had flown a
number of reconnaissance missions over the Guadalcanal-Tulagi Islands
area from Port Moresby, New Guinea.

General Vandegrift particularly desired recent photographs of the north
coast of Guadalcanal, the area he was called on to assault.  He received
only two, a print of Tulagi Island and one of the Lunga Point-Kukum area
of Guadalcanal-both dropped on a carrier by light planes, developed, and
forwarded to the Marine commander by COMAIRSOPAC, and constituting the
first photos to reach General Vandegrift since 24 Jun.

At no time during 1942 were trained Army personnel or Army photographic
equipment available for photographic work.  Cameras came from the Navy,
photographers from the Marines.  Only the 11th Bomb Group's B-17's
represented the Army, and this condition remained SOP until USAAF photo
and mapping units arrived in 1943.  "Quackenbush's Gypsies," as
Lieutenant Commander Robert Quackenbush's naval photo personnel were
named, regularly flew with the B-17's on photographic coverage of the
Solomon Islands.

Colonel Saunders' bombardment directive from Admiral McCain was both
general and concise: to hit Tulagi and Guadalcanal Islands with maximum
strength from 31 Jul to 6 Aug, inclusive.  COMAIRSOPAC left the group
commander free to carry out this task as he saw fit, and the 11th
forthwith inaugurated heavy bombardment against the Japanese in the
South Pacific.  During the 7 days, in addition to 22 sorties for
purposes of search, the group flew 56 bombardment sorties, a most
creditable performance in view of the primitive conditions under which
operations labored.

Although the advanced field on Espiritu Santo Island was reported ready,
Colonel Saunders was skeptical as to its service facilities and decided
to open his attack from Efate Island, 710 nautical miles (1,315 km) from
the target at Guadalcanal.  For his first mission on 31 Jul, Colonel
Saunders mustered every plane possessing a radio compartment tank.
Since each of the nine aircraft thus equipped also carried a bomb-bay
tank, full bomb loads were impossible.  But in spite of this
considerable reduction in striking power, the initial blow was a
success.  Led by Colonel Saunders, the B-17s flew the 710 miles to
Guadalcanal under the protection of bad weather and unloaded their bombs
from 14,000 feet (4,267 m).  The first flight, carrying 500-pounders
(227 kg), struck at the new landing strip, while the remaining six
aircraft ravaged the supply dumps in the Lunga Point area with 100-
pounders (45 kg).  Resistance was slight, the AAA ineffective, and the
Rufes at Gavutu Island, probably without functioning radar, failed to
leave the water in time for interception.  The bombers came through
Mission One against Guadalcanal undamaged.

It was determined that Lunga Point on Guadalcanal held the chief
concentrations of supply and personnel and first claim to Colonel
Saunders' attention.   Next ranked the nearly complete Lunga airdrome,
shortly to become Henderson Field.  Tulagi Island also was to receive a
quota of bombs almost daily.

Thus was the pattern set.  On 1 Aug the B-17's bagged two Rufes, on the
next day they got one and started fires in the Lunga, Guadalcanal, and
Tulagi Island storage areas.  By the 3d, reports had come in of land-
based Mitsubishi A6M, Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighters (Zekes) on the Lunga
field and on 4 Aug five enemy fighters intercepted a three-plane flight
over the target.  In this engagement a Rufe, flaming and pressing a
close attack, struck a B-17 near the No. 3 engine, causing an explosion
which destroyed plane and crew.  This, the first destruction of one of
our aircraft by ramming, was considered the result of a Rufe out of
control rather than intentional self-sacrifice.

With the field on Espiritu Santo Island operational by 1 Aug, B-17's
headed for Guadalcanal were able to take on full bomb loads, fill their
radio tanks on Efate Island, and refuel at Espiritu Santo Island on the
return leg.  Tulagi Island and the Kukum area of Guadalcanal were thus
bombed on 5 Aug, when another B-17 was lost; and on D-Day, 7 Aug, two
search planes dispatched to cover the Solomon Islands sector to a depth
of 700 miles (1,296 km) from Espiritu Santo Island, by that time the
main base, took off at 0300 hours with instructions to avoid the target
area where the attack was scheduled at 0530 hours.  One aircraft failed
to return.

Date:    Mon, 4 Mar 1996 20:36:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Guadalcanal Air War 2/6

GUADALCANAL ASSAULT OPENS

Below the searching B-17's the battle of Guadalcanal was unfolding.  Two
major task forces had been set up for the occasion: Rear Admiral Leigh
Noyes commanded the supporting carriers, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner
the amphibious force which would undertake the assault.  Over-all
command of these groups was vested in Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
in USS Saratoga (CV-3).

On 31 Jul the amphibious force had left Koro Island in the Fiji Islands,
where it had proceeded from New Zealand to hold landing rehearsals.  As
the fleet cleared the New Hebrides Islands the weather changed to a
complete overcast, effectively hiding the force from enemy search
planes.  Navy Consolidated PBY Catalinas, meanwhile, operating from
Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands towards enemy bases to the north,
reported no hostile concentrations.  At 0133 hours, 7 Aug the dim bulk
of Guadalcanal could be made out, and the assault forces slid past Savo
Island, the one to the north headed for Tulagi Island, the southern
standing in for the Lunga area of Guadalcanal.  The surprise was
complete.

At 0613 hours, the heavy cruiser USS Quincy (CA-39) opened on targets
near Kukum on Guadalcanal and 2 minutes later carrier planes, appearing
on schedule, joined the attack.  Simultaneously the bombardment of
Tulagi Island commenced.  The landing at Guadalcanal occurred without
opposition.  Carrier-based aircraft from USS Enterprise (CV-6) and USS
Saratoga (CV-3) shielded the operation.  Instead of the 5,000 enemy
estimated on the island, a mere 600 Japanese were reported by prisoners
and these promptly took to the hills.  The Marines met relatively light
opposition on Guadalcanal during the first day, but on Gavutu and Tulagi
Islands, across Sealark Channel between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands,
resistance was fierce and these islands were not mopped up for several
days.

On 8 Aug the Marines occupied Lunga airdrome on Guadalcanal.  [NOTE: On
17 Aug this field was unofficially designated Henderson Field after
Marine Major Lofton Henderson.  Construction begun by the Japanese was
carried on by the Marine 1st Engineer Battalion until the arrival of the
6th Naval Construction Battalion, the Seabees.  In Nov 42 Fighter #1,
1 mile (1.6 km) East of Henderson Field, was rendered operational by the
Seabees and had been used in emergencies as early as October.  Before
the end of the year Fighter #2, west of Henderson Field, was also in
operation.]  The runway, damaged by 11th Bomb Group attacks, was rapidly
repairable, and in addition to this important field, large semi-permanent
camps, finger wharves, machine shops, radio sets, and an ice and power
plant fell to the Marines.  These gains, however, were not to be
consolidated in peace.  The Japanese reacted promptly with air and naval
forces, and on the afternoon of D-day hurled two heavy air attacks at
the transports lying off Guadalcanal.

The evening of 8 Aug, Admiral Fletcher requested permission to withdraw
his carriers.  Combat with raiding enemy aircraft and other causes had
reduced his carrier strength from 99 to 78 fighters.  Fuel was running
low and the presence of large numbers of enemy bombers in the area
presented a serious menace.  Admiral Ghormley agreed to the request
late that night and towards morning the Air Support Force began
retirement to the south.  Its withdrawal left the amphibious force
dangerously exposed to enemy air, and the decision was consequently
taken to withdraw the remainder of the invasion fleet at 0600 hours the
following day.  Previously it had been planned that the transports would
unload until D+4.

On 8 Aug the Japanese Navy took a hand.  Through the moonless, Solomon
Islands night a Japanese task force, slipping down past Savo Island,
closed with the Allied cruisers protecting the transports off
Guadalcanal.  Searchlights and flares illumined the sea; then the
sudden shock of shell and torpedo-and when the Japanese fleet retired
into the night it had sunk four heavy cruisers and one destroyer, the
core of the forces patrolling off Savo Island.  The beachhead was
uncovered.  The Marines were left to shift for themselves, and on 9 Aug
the transports up-anchored for the safety of Noumea, New Caledonia
Island.

For a time, the 11th Bomb Group settled back into its search routine.
On days immediately following the landings, the bombers covered the
Lower Solomon Islands on sectors ranging from 286 degrees over to 316
degrees from Espiritu Santo Island to a depth of 700 to 800 miles
(1,296 to 1,482 km).  Ordinarily, contact was with friendly surface
forces.  However, on 9 Aug, two light cruisers, two destroyers, and a
number of seaplane tenders were reported heading for Rekata Bay on Santa
Isabel Island.  Eight B-17's were bombed up and took off but, despite
ideal visibility, failed to sight the enemy.  Daily searches through 14
Aug failed to reveal anything significantly a handful of landing
barges on Florida Island.

By 15 Aug the Japanese were more in evidence.  Destroyers, cargo
vessels, even light cruisers began to frequent the central Solomon
Islands, and Gizo Island and Gizo Bay in the New Georgia Islands became
favorite target areas for the 11th Bomb Group.  Moreover, the tedium of
the long searches was apt to be broken by engagements with the huge
Japanese patrol aircraft, the four-engine Kawanishi H6K, Navy Type 97
Flying Boat (Mavis).  These Goliaths were slower and less maneuverable
than the B-17's; their 20-mm cannon were outranged by the .50-caliber
(12.7 mm) machine guns.  Invariably Colonel Saunders' pilots attempted
to close with them.  The first victim fell to the crew of Captain W. Y.
Lucas when, after a 25-minute combat the Mavis, attempting to settle her
damaged bulk on the sea, was blown up by the B-17's tall gunner.  By 30
Sep the 11th Bomb Group had encountered 21 Mavis'; 5 were destroyed and
7 damaged.

Meantime the enemy prepared his counterblow.  On 12 Aug Admiral Ghormley
had reported naval concentrations at Rabaul, New Britain Island and in
the Bougainville Island region.  A week later these concentrations began
to appear in the Buin, Bougainville Island-Faisi, Shortland Island area,
and on 20 Aug the Admiral warned Colonel Saunders that the task forces
to retake Guadalcanal already were moving down from Truk and Ponape
Islands in the Caroline Islands.  The grinding routine of sea search
became of utmost importance.  Day after day, the B-17's, taking off from
Espiritu Santo Island at 0300 hours, crossing over Tulagi Island at
sunrise and, scouring the sea to the northwest, logged 1,600 miles
(2,963 km) of open-water flying.

Daily action had taken its toll.  From 31 Jul to 20 Aug, 11 B-17's were
lost, 8 operationally, 2 at sea, only 1 in combat.  Men and equipment
stood up well against the enemy.  Japanese gunnery, both aerial and AAA,
was uniformly poor and the supposedly fanatical pilots showed little
eagerness to close with the B-17's.  During the 8 days of intensive
operations preceding the landings, enemy fighters were engaged on all
but two missions to the Guadalcanal-Tulagi Islands area and other than
in the "ramming" incident, no B-17 was lost to Rufes.  The few hits
scored on the heavies were by 7.7 mm fire and not very damaging.  Three
crew members were slightly wounded.  The pilots learned that the
Japanese always attacked singly, that, if the B-17s turned their
formation into him, he would always draw off at the fire of the turret
guns.  Bad weather, not the Rufe and Zeke, was the chief antagonist.
Lack of homing facilities and radio direction-finding equipment brought
down more B-17's than enemy pilots did.

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

In the Pacific theaters nature and distance are usually as formidable a
foe as the Japanese.  When Colonel Saunders and his 98th Bomb Squadron
set their B-17E's down on Plaines des Gaiacs, New Caledonia Island on 21
Jul, they found a red dust strip hacked out of a swamp.  High in iron
oxide, this dust, sifting through the filters, honed out the cylinders,
so that shortly the B-17's were fortunate to fly 6 hours with a full
load of oil.  Additional complications were lack of service and
maintenance personnel.  Nine maintenance men for nine aircraft were all
that could accompany the 26th to Efate Island, and these nine served
additionally as ground crews during the subsequent 3-week period of
intensive operations.  Under such circumstances, a large share of the
service and maintenance burden fell upon the combat crews.  The 26th
owed a debt of gratitude to the Negro enlisted men of the 24th Infantry
Regiment who helped to service the planes and even improvised spare
parts.  Artillerymen messed the airmen on Efate Island, while over on
Espiritu Santo Island the entire 98th Bomb Squadron, not excepting
Colonel Saunders, slept under trees or wings, or in the B-17s
themselves.

The 11th had no water carts; two of its eight Cletracs had arrived at
Nandi in the Fiji Islands, when they were needed at Espiritu Santo
Island.  The shops aboard the seaplane tender USS Curtiss (AV-4),
Admiral McCain's headquarters, contributed tow bars; but homing devices
and navigational aids could not be improvised.

At Espiritu Santo Island existed a fair example of South Pacific
logistics.  On 18 Aug Colonel Saunders described its unloading
facilities as "one barge, a sandy beach and a prayer."  Heavy equipment
was slung over the side of cargo vessels into a lighter.  Ashore there
were no cranes and the small, finger piers made of coconut logs salted
down with coral washed out and disappeared after 2 or 3 weeks' use.
Since the supply officer seldom was informed of arrival dates, boxes and
crates accumulated in the coconut groves.  There was no question of
living off the country; each item of food, clothing, and housing had to
be brought in.  The mud was there in abundance.  Espiritu Santo Island
possessed a foot (31 cm)-thick covering of soft black dirt, a quagmire
after the tropical rains.

The Navy had moved .50-caliber (12.7 mm) ammunition and 300,000 gallons
(1,135,620 l) of gasoline to Espiritu Santo Island in preparation for
the 11th Bomb Group.  Fuel consumption had been estimated for 2 weeks of
operations and a safety factor of 100 per cent allowed, but the supply
was exhausted in 10 days and only the timely arrival of the SS Nira
Luckenbach with 3,000 drums of gasoline prevented operations from coming
to a sudden halt.  Getting the fuel out of the drums and into the tanks
of the B-17's was one of those impossible jobs which somehow got done.
Gasoline trucks and trailers did not exist; the steel drums were dumped
over the ship's side, floated ashore in nets, hand-rolled up under the
trees, and dispersed in dumps of 20 to 30.  From these they were loaded
on trucks, rolled up on stands, and emptied into the tank wagons which
serviced the aircraft.  On 6 Aug, all available hands-and available
hands included Colonel Saunders and Brigadier General William C. Rose,
who commanded ground forces on Espiritu Santo and Efate Islands-worked a
bucket line for 20 hours in a driving storm to put 25,000 gallons
(94,635 l) of gasoline aboard the bombers.  But such labors were not
enough, and strike missions were delayed for lack of service facilities.

Espiritu Santo Island's airdrome was no Randolph Field, Texas.  A narrow
strip cut partly from a coconut grove, partly from the encroaching
jungle; revetments barely deep enough to keep a B-17's nose off the
runway and so narrow a man had to stand at each wing tip to guide the
pilots out to the short taxiway; no lights.  Bottles of oil with paper
wicks flickered along the runway and jeep headlights marked its end as
the early morning missions took off. The squadrons of the 11th Bomb
Group were distributed as follows: the 42d Bomb Squadron at Plaines des
Gaiacs on New Caledonia Island; the 98th Bomb Squadron at Espiritu
Santo Island, where the 26th Bomb Squadron subsequently joined from
Efate Island; and the 431st Bomb Squadron at Nandi, Fiji Islands.
Headquarters was at Efate Island, New Hebrides Island, but Colonel
Saunders maintained a command post on Espiritu Santo Island and flew
part of his headquarters personnel there on 10 Aug.  Nandi, the most
rearward of the bases, was clean and quiet and served as a rest area and
a convenient place for engine changes.  Colonel Saunders regularly
relieved his units after 1 week in the forward area.

Operational control defied the field manuals.  The wide dispersal of the
units and unreliable radio communications made contact with the
squadrons exceedingly difficult.  Colonel Saunders could exercise direct
control only over the 14 B-17's on Espiritu Santo Island, and even this
was complicated by lack of field telephones and motor transport.  He was
running four search missions daily and holding six aircraft for a
striking force.  In an emergency he might supplement the latter with six
B-17's from Efate Island, but he strongly doubted that the Efate Island
contingent could hit the target at such a distance.  He advised General
Harmon that additional fields were needed on Espiritu Santo Island.

By the 18th of Aug, the supply situation of the group had become
critical.  Six ball turret doors had already broken off and no spares
were available.  Turbosupercharger regulators were giving trouble, as
were flight and engine instruments.  The dusty fields necessitated
constant engine changes; Nandi's 12 spares were already in service and
the next change at Plaines des Gaiacs would exhaust the supply in New
Caledonia.  But in spite of such operational aches and twinges, the
11th Bomb Group was prepared to take part in the series of actions known
as the Battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands, the first Japanese attempt
to retake Guadalcanal.

BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS

Following the disastrous Savo Island drama, there had been a lull on
Guadalcanal.  The Navy ran in small reinforcement convoys, but operated
its task forces well to the southward of the island, out of range of
Japanese search planes; and the enemy seized the opportunity to
reinforce Guadalcanal on his own account.  Nightly, his destroyers and
cruisers shelled the Marines, for the most part without let or
hindrance.  The beginnings of the "Tokyo Express" were discernible.

However, on 19 Aug a light cruiser venturing on such a reinforcement
mission was unwisely left exposed in Sealark Channel between Guadalcanal
and Florida Islands by day.  A searching B-17 spotted her, banked for a
bombing run.  The delighted Marines saw columns of dark brown smoke pour
from abaft the warship's mainmast.  She made for the open sea beyond
Savo Island, her fantail afire, and later sank.

On 23 Aug the Navy received warning that the Japanese were moving on the
Solomon Islands from the north.  Carrier task forces, including USS
Saratoga (CV-3), USS Enterprise (CV-6), and the new battleship USS
North Carolina (BB-55) were readied to meet the threat.  On 24 Aug the
Saratoga's torpedo and dive bombers, engaging the Japanese carrier HIJMS
Ryujo, sent her into an evasive turn, dived in a coordinated attack, and
hammered their bombs the length of her deck.  Fierce air battles during
the day all but stripped the enemy carriers of their aircraft and by
nightfall the enemy fleet, badly hurt, retired.  The damaged USS
Enterprise returned to Pearl Harbor for repair.

In relation to its striking power the 11th Bomb Group played an
important role in this action.  On 24 Aug at 1215 hours Colonel Saunders
was advised of a contact with an enemy carrier force 720 miles (1,333
km) from Espiritu Santo Island.  Admiral McCain, aware that a B-17
strike would involve hazardous night landings, left the attack decision
to Colonel Saunders.  The risk was accepted.  Two flights of B-17s were
dispatched separately, three B-17s under Major Ernest R. Mannierre and
four led by Major Stewart.

At 1745 hours the three-plane flight attacked a carrier, dead in the
water and under tow by a cruiser or large destroyer.  On the first run
the bombs overshot and the B-17s banked for another try.  Four direct
hits were claimed. (Whether this vessel was HIJMS Ryujo, blasted more
than an hour before by USS Saratoga's planes, or another small carrier
is unknown.)

When this flight returned to Espiritu Santo Island the night landing
took its toll.  Espiritu Santo Island's field was just a wide slash
through the jungle, with low hills close in.  As the planes approached,
a tropical rainstorm drenched the field and the darkness was complete.
Lieutenant Robert E. Guenther's plane, the No. 4 engine failing, went
into a steep bank and crashed into the hillside.  The pilot and four of
the crew were lost.

B-17'S ASSAIL JAPANESE SHIPS

Sixty miles (111 km) to the eastward of Major Mannierre's strike, Major
Stewart's four B-17's surprised a second Japanese armada at twilight.
Below the B-17s plowed a possible small carrier, with escort of one
battleship, four light cruisers, and four destroyers.  The B-17s
steadied for the run.  Two or more hits were claimed on the carrier, but
final results were observed only by one ball turret gunner who contended
that the warship could not have been a carrier since the 500 pounders
(227 kg) had "knocked her turrets off."  The attack did not go
unopposed, and of a swarm of Zekes attacking the bombers five were
surely, seven probably destroyed.  Two of the B-17s were damaged and
all were desperately low on fuel, but Major Stewart led his flight back
to Efate Island intact.

Again on 25 Aug the B-17's saw action.  The preceding day Lunga
airdrome, now named Henderson Field after the commander of the Marine
dive bombers at Midway Island, had been attacked by land and carrier-
based planes, the latter probably from HIJMS Ryujo.  Newly arrived
Marine pilots, defending the Guadalcanal lodgment, knocked down 21 of
the attackers for a loss of 3.  At midnight the Marine positions were
shelled by four enemy warships, one of which may have been sunk by dive
bombers from Henderson Field.  A dawn air attack was anticipated but
none came.

At 0835 hours on 25 Aug eight escorted dive bombers from Guadalcanal
uncovered the main Japanese occupation force about 125 miles (232 km) to
the north.  One large and three small transports, escorted by a heavy
cruiser, light cruisers, and four destroyers, presented a fat target.
Thousand-pounders (454 kg) gutted the large transport and damaged the
heavy cruiser.  Eight additional B-17's, leaving distant Espiritu Santo
Island at 0617 hours, broke the back of either a cruiser or a destroyer
with three direct hits from 500-pounders (227 kg) and at 1015 hours saw
her sink.  By 1200 hours of 25 Aug the Japanese were making all speed to
the north and Guadalcanal was, for the moment, secure.

>From this telling action, the 11th Bomb Group returned to the tedium of
search duties and primitive operational conditions.  The enemy reverted
to a pattern of harassing attacks and minor reinforcement efforts.  At
1200 hours on 25 Aug, 21 Japanese bombers pounded Henderson Field, and
that evening destroyers landed reinforcements at Cape Esperance on
Guadalcanal and came down Sealark Channel between Guadalcanal and
Florida Islands, guns ablaze.  By this time, however, Guadalcanal had
the means to defend itself, partially at least, against such measures;
Marine fighters and dive bombers were based on the island and elements
of the USAAF's 67th Fighter Squadron had arrived.

THE JAGDSTAFFEL

Except for lone, cruising  B-17's, the Marines saw few friendly aircraft
for almost two weeks after the withdrawal of the Navy carriers on the
night of 8 Aug.  Meanwhile, back-breaking labor was completing the
unfinished Japanese air strip, and on the afternoon of the 20 Aug, the
escort carrier USS Long Island (ACV-1), from some 200 miles (370 km)
southeast of Guadalcanal, catapulted two Marine squadrons, Marine
Fighting Squadron TWO HUNDRED TWENTY THREE (VMF-223) with 19 Grumman
F4F-4 Wildcat fighters under Major John L. Smith and Marine Scout- or
Dive-Bombing Squadron TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (VMSB-232) with 12 Douglas
SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers under Lieutenant Colonel Richard C.
Mangrum.  These were followed in 2 days by five long-nosed Army
fighters, P-400's of the 67th Fighter Squadron, under Captain Dale
Brannon.

The P-400's which flew into Henderson Field on 22 Aug inaugurated a
route over which many an Army fighter was destined to pass before the
Japanese were driven from the Lower Solomon Islands.  In none too short
hops they had flown all the way from New Caledonia Island, employing the
Atlantic technique-fighters, equipped with belly tanks, shepherded by
bombers or transports.

Leaving Planes des Gaiacs, New Caledonia Island on 21 Aug, Captain
Brannon's flight of five hopped 325 miles (602 km) to Efate Island, 180
miles (333 km) to Espiritu Santo Island.  The following day, with
gasoline tanks topped off after the warm-up, the P-400's tackled the 640
miles (1,185 km) to Henderson Field.  Gasoline consumption had been
predicated upon low engine speed, a lean mixture, a 15-mph (28 km/h)
tall wind, and, in Captain Brannon's opinion, a landing powered by the
proverbial fumes. Imperfect navigation and enemy fighters were written
off.

The P-400's flew on the deck, at 200 feet (61 m), through mist and
lowhanging clouds.  In clear spaces, they spread out; when weather
loomed ahead, they snuggled under the navigating B-17's wing.  A second
B-17 followed with rubber boats, to be tossed to the pilots if they
balled out.  After 3.75 hours of flying, all five planes were set down
on the Lunga air strip.  The following day, Lieutenant Robert E. Chilson
with 30 enlisted men of the 67th's ground echelon arrived off Lunga in
the cargo ship USS Fomalhaute (AK-22); and when Captain John A. Thompson
brought in nine more P-400's on 27 Aug, the 67th was ready for action.

Date:    Mon, 4 Mar 1996 20:37:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Guadalcanal Air War 3/6

THE 67TH FIGHTER SQUADRON

If hardships prepare men for hardships, the 67th Fighter Squadron was
prepared for Guadalcanal.  Its personnel had sailed from New York in
Jan 42 in a crowded transport with inadequate water tanks-the men had
received a daily ration of one canteen for washing, drinking, and
shaving.  After 38 days at sea they were rested for a week at a camp
near Melbourne, Australia, and on 15 Mar disembarked on New Caledonia
Island, where the inhabitants, military and civilian, momentarily
expected the  Japanese.

The 67th's airplanes were not only in crates but of a type only two of
its pilots had ever flown.  The 67th's new home was a half-completed
airfield up at Tontouta, 35 miles (56 km) from Noumea, New Caledonia
Island.  Its one combination truck and trailer took one of the crated
planes to Tontouta every 8 hours, alternately groaning and highballing
over the mountainous road.  When the crates were pried open instructions
for P-39D's, F's, and K's were found, but none for P-400's; neither were
the mechanics familiar with the plane.  Still the work of assembly went
forward.  The men slept under shelter halves, the officers in a
farmhouse-44 of them in parlor, bedroom, and earth-floored basement.
All united in cursing the sudden, unpredictable rains and in fighting
the mosquitoes.

Tools for assembly consisted of 10 kits of simple first-echelon
maintenance tools.  Lines were found plugged with Scotch tape; one
P-400's electrical circuit had evidently had the attention of a factory
maniac: when the flap switch was pressed wheels would retract; when the
wheel switch was pressed the guns would fire.  Nevertheless, in less
than a month 41 planes were assembled with the aid of the 65th Materiel
Squadron, and the pilots were checked out with only a single accident.
The squadron, finding that the P-400's instruments were inferior,
learned how to fly without them.  Spare parts all came from salvage; and
one plane, "The Resurrection," eventually evolved as a 100-percent
mongrel.

FIRST ACTION

When Captain Brannon and his pilots landed at Henderson Field, action
was not long in coming.  The Marine pilots had pointed out on a little
knoll near the runway the Japanese pagoda which served as Allied air
operations headquarters.  Near it was a flagpole up which a black flag
was run when an air raid threatened.  There was no real warning system-
the first radar did not function until Sep-but from other sources
reports of approaching enemy formations were received.

On the hot, sunny afternoon of 24 Aug, pilots and ground crews were
working around the P-400's when the black flag was hoisted.  Already the
drone of engines could be heard.  Two of the 67th's pilots made a run
for their planes, Captain Brannon and Lieutenant D. H. Fincher taking
off with the F4F's in a cloud of dust.  Thirty seconds later the bombs
hit.  The P-400's staggered off over the palm trees and evaded the Zekes
sweeping down to strafe.

The F4F's climbed to 8,000 feet (2,438 m), knocked down all but one of
the nine enemy bombers, which may have come from the doomed HIJMS Ryujo
off to the north.  The Army pilots happened on a wandering Zeke, pumped
lead until it exploded.

The Marines, living largely on the Japanese quartermaster, introduced
the pilots to life on Guadalcanal.  In the green, canopied Marine tents
were straw sleeping mats and enamelware eating bowls--both Japanese.
Also Japanese were the chow, largely fish and rice, the cigarettes, and
even the caramels.  Socks, always too short, and loincloths were also
available by courtesy of the Japanese QM.  And across the river, a bare
200 yards (183 m) away, was the enemy, with his snipers always alert for
U.S. officers' insignia.

Until the arrival of VMF-223 and VMSB-232, the Tulagi-Guadalcanal
Islands area had been without air resources.  Moreover, few supplies had
come through to the beachhead.  General Vandegrift had thrown a
perimeter defense around the airfield upon its capture and was able to
set up one battery of 90 mm guns and 58 automatic weapon positions
against enemy air raids.  The F4F-4's were immediately assigned the air
defense of the area and the SBD's began to conduct long single-plane
searches over enemy positions at Guadalcanal and northward up to New
Georgia and Santa Isabel Islands.  Operating under Marine command, the
P-400's soon took up part of the burden.  On 25 Aug, they were up on
dawn-to-dusk patrols over Henderson Field and on 26 Aug two pilots flew
reconnaissance around the entire Guadalcanal coastline.

By the last week in Aug, Japanese tactics in the Solomon Islands had
begun to take form.  In the Buin, Bougainville Island-Faisi, Shortland
Island area; on Vella Lavella Island in the New Georgia Islands; on Kula
Gulf between New Georgia and Kolombangara Islands; and at Rekata Bay on
Santa Isabel Island, the Japanese had bases easily supplied from Truk
Island and Rabaul, New Britain Island.  By Sep, enemy men and supplies
were being loaded on fast vessels-destroyers or cruisers.  These
marauders, hiding from the Henderson Field-based aircraft during
daylight, by night came fast down "The Slot" between the parallel lines
of islands, landed men and supplies, stood off Henderson Field, shelled
it, and were generally safe in the central Solomon Islands by daylight.
Thus the enemy in the Guadalcanal bush would be reinforced to the point
of mounting a final attack on the beachhead, at which time other
Japanese, supported by a sizeable portion of the Imperial Navy, would be
brought down from the Mandates as an occupation force.  Such actions
were feasible so long as the enemy controlled the sea approaches to the
Lower Solomon Islands.  Once these were lost, as they were in the mid-
Nov 42 engagements, the enemy was obliged to rely for reinforcements
solely on the Tokyo Express.

Meanwhile, air attacks on Henderson Field were carried out almost daily
from Rabaul, New Britain Island via Kahili Field in southern
Bougainville Island and various harassments maintained against the
American garrison.  These latter were ingenious sleep-destroyers.
"Oscar," a submarine, surfaced nightly in the dark off Lunga,
reconnoitered, threw a few shells at either Tulagi or Guadalcanal
Islands.  After midnight, an asthmatic two-engine bomber, variously
named "Louie the Louse," "Washing Machine Charlie," or "Maytag Mike,"
would lay a stick of bombs across the field.

The 67th Fighter Squadron performed its daily patrols at the dangerous
medium altitude of 14,000 feet (4,267 m).  The planes could struggle a
little higher, but the pilots, without oxygen, could not make
long-sustained flights at this altitude. [These P-400's had been
intended for export to the British and were equipped with the British
high-pressure oxygen system.  No high-pressure oxygen bottles were
available on either New Caledonia or Guadalcanal Islands.]  The P-400's
days as an interceptor were numbered.

FAIL TO REACH BOMBERS

On 29 Aug 42 came the first test.  The P-400's were scrambled at 1200
hours to meet 18 enemy bombers with the usual Zeke escort.  Twelve went
up in flights of four, climbed to 14,000 feet (4,267 m), and, to quote
the squadron's historian, "staggered around, looking closely at all
spots within their vision to make sure they were just spots and not
enemy formations."  The bombers rode safely above, at 17,000 feet
(5,182 m) until the F4F-4's hit them, knocking down four bombers and
four escorts.  The discouraged P-400's pilots returned to a runway
swarming with men.  The strip seemed to have sprouted bushes; as it
turned out the ground crews were using them to mark bomb craters.
Ammunition was exploding; grass, hangars, and aircraft were afire; and
scores of enemy snipers in the trees across the river.

30 Aug 42 was a busy day.  It began for the 67th Fighter Squadron at
0000 hours; the SBD's had been sent on a hunt for enemy destroyers and
the Army pilots were continuously on the alert until dawn, when their
regular  duties began.  That day these consisted of maintaining combat
air patrol over four friendly destroyers at Tulagi Island.  The enemy
raid was due at about 1200 hours-"Tojo Time"-as it was known from the
regularity with which the enemy appeared at that hour.  The coast
watchers reported 22 single-engine planes coming in from Buka Passage
between Buka and Bougainville Islands, and at 1130 hours all aircraft
came in for reservicing.

It was reasoned that the Japanese would not send Zekes down alone, so
the single-engine aircraft must be dive bombers and their target the
ships at Tulagi Island.  Eight F4F's and 11 P-400's were in commission
and were disposed to meet the expected attack.  Four P-400's were to
patrol over Tulagi Island and hop the dive bombers as they pulled out;
seven cruised the towering cumulus at 14,000 feet (4,267 m) to engage
the enemy as he started down.  The F4F's were somewhat above the latter
group.

The seven P-400's had been cruising for about 30 minutes and already
were feeling lack of oxygen when they were attacked, not by dive bombers
but by Zekes.  The agile Japanese dived down around a cloud, climbed up
to take the P-400's from behind and below.  They numbered about 20.  The
P-400's had started turning into a Lufbery in which there were more
Zekes than P-400's when the F4F's dived and the melee became general.
The astonishing Zekes were making almost square turns and the Army
pilots found the only way to shake them was to head down for a cloud,
make a turn on instruments, and come out on top, ready for a pass.

Below, the weather over the sea had closed down to 1,000 feet (305 m)
and quarter-mile (402 m) visibility, and consequently the four-plane
patrol started back.  Coming out of a rain squall, the P-400's were
attacked by a half-dozen Zekes and their formation torn apart.  Two of
the pilots, Lieutenants R.E. Wythes and R.E. Chilson, did not return.

Altogether four P-400's were lost, two pilots later making their way to
Henderson Field on foot, after balling out.  Five of the seven returning
planes were out of commission by reason of bullet holes.  Against these
losses, the 67th Fighter Squadron was credited with four kills.  The
Marines got 14.

That did not end the day's activities.  At 1500 hours, 17 F4F's and a
dozen SBD's, with two escorting B-17's, arrived at Guadalcanal.  Thirty
minutes later, with 18 planes on Henderson Field, the Japanese dive
bombers arrived.  Ignoring the tempting array on the air strip, they
caught the destroyer USS Blue (DD-387) a half mile (805 m) offshore and
sank her.  Across at Tulagi Island, the transport USS Burrows (AP-6) ran
aground and, to add to the commotion, nature intervened around 1615
hours with two earthquakes.  That evening the Tokyo Express ran again,
giving Henderson Field a shelling.  Through all this, after but 4 days
of operations at full strength, only three of the original 14 P-400's
survived in commission on 1 Sep 42.

The air battle of 30 Aug proved that the P-400's on Guadalcanal could
not be used as interceptors.  In addition to the planes shot down, six
returned to Henderson Field that afternoon riddled beyond repair.  The
67th Fighter Squadron had early been aware of the limitations of its
planes and the reports of the action of the 30th convinced General
Harmon.  No Army or Marine aircraft then extant was entirely
satisfactory against the Zeke, but the P-400's possessed a peculiar
disadvantage in that they were unable to reach the altitude customarily
employed by enemy bombers.  Rate of climb was low, wing load excessive,
and the engine extremely vulnerable to hits in the glycol cooling
system.  The P-400 had been flown under far from optimum conditions, but
its pilots were skilled and courageous, as Major Smith, commanding
VMF-223, later testified.  General Harmon immediately asked Washington
for Lockheed P-38 Lightning and Republic P-47 Thunderbolt squadrons, or
the Curtiss P-40F with the Packard-built Rolls Royce Merlin engine.
Meanwhile, since the P-39 type was his mainstay in the theater, the
General cast about for ways of improving its performance.  He considered
that since .50-caliber (12.7 mm) bullets nearly disintegrated the Zekes,
the 37 mm cannon in the P-39 could be replaced by either a .50-caliber
machine gun or a 20 mm cannon.  This would have the effect of lightening
the plane.

Washington showed equal concern over the record of the 67th Fighter
Squadron and the specific dictum of General Vandegrift that the P-400
was "entirely unsuitable" for operations on Guadalcanal.  But the war
had to be fought with weapons presently available and considerable
numbers of P-39's were on their way to Pacific theaters.  The
recommended solution was stripping the fighter to lighten it.  By the
end, of Sep 42, the P-39K minus 650 pounds (295 kg) of its original
equipment had achieved a service ceiling of 27,000 feet (8,230 m), and
the Bell aircraft's performance against the Japanese eventually reached
heights far above that of the old P-400's-the "klunkers," as the 67th
Fighter Squadron dubbed them.

THE P-400 AS AN ATTACK PLANE

Meantime General Vandegrift at Guadalcanal faced the immediate problem-
he had the undesirable aircraft on hand and had to find a use for it.
The planes possessed good defensive armor plate and armament consisting
of a 20 mm cannon, two .50-caliber (12.7 mm) and four .30-caliber
(7.62 mm) machine guns; they could each carry one bomb and their engines
operated reasonably well at low altitudes.  The Japanese, moreover, had
shown no extraordinary talent with flak.  As an attack plane, then, the
P-400 could use its bomb on shipping and shore installations, its 20 mm
cannon on landing barges, and its machine guns on enemy personnel.

About 20 miles (32 km) east of Henderson Field, the Japanese held the
native village of Tasimboko in some strength.  The Marines planned to
bring fresh troops from Tulagi Island, effect a landing east of
Tasimboko, strike the position from the rear, and retire the same day.
In preparation for this operation, the P-400's tried their wings in a
new employment.

On the night of 1 Sep 42, two enemy transports and two destroyers lay
off Tasimboko discharging troops.  Foul weather having prevented the
SBD's from interfering during darkness, Captain Brannon with five
P-400's took off at 0600 hours to attack landing parties in the area.
None were found, but five beached landing craft were sighted.  At 0800
hours four more P-400's took off; they dropped 500-pound (227 kg) bombs
on the village and strafed both the landing craft and the village.  Back
on Henderson Field, Tojo Time was imminent and rather than sit out the
attack, the P-400's returned to Tasimboko.  In their absence 18 bombers,
escorted by 21 Zekes, came over Henderson Field.  The F4F-4's reduced
their number by three bombers and four fighters, but the P-400's
returned to a cratered runway, a burned-out hangar, three fired SBD's,
burning gasoline and ammunition dumps, and a good many delayed-action
bombs.

Such expeditions became routine with the 67th Fighter Squadron, which
began to be known as the "Jagdstaffel."  The mechanics could always
produce a pair of "klunkers" to go out and work over the Japanese.  At
first, the pilots chose their own targets-landing barges or supply
dumps.  Later they were sent out to bomb and strafe in the inlets and
coves of Santa Isabel Island, where the enemy maintained jumping-off
points for reinforcing Guadalcanal, and their bombing eventually became
so accurate they could be assigned targets quite close to the Marine
lines.

Day by day the P-400's went up to Tasimboko while the Japanese bombed
or shelled Henderson Field.  On 4 Sep 42, with only three P-400's in
commission and 13 pilots to fly them, word was received that the enemy
was putting men ashore in landing barges up on Santa Isabel Island, 75
miles (139 km) northwest of Henderson Field.  Led by Major Robert E.
Galer in his F4F-4, the three P-400's were on their way by 1440 hours;
the target was easily located in a small cove.  Six loaded landing craft
were destroyed by two direct hits with 500-pounders (227 kg) and the
boats and men still landing were thoroughly strafed.  Altogether a total
of 25 landing craft out of 30 seen in the area were claimed destroyed.
That night, however, the Japanese retaliated with the Express, a light
cruiser and two destroyers sinking the American destroyer-transports
USS Little (APD-4) and USS Gregory (APD-3) off Savo Island Island.

On 5 Sep, after all personnel on Henderson Field had undergone a dismal
night of enemy shelling, the Jagdstaffel and the F4F's uncovered a prime
target-15 fully loaded landing barges about 500 yards (457 m) off the
northwest coast of Guadalcanal.  Six F4F's and two P-400's strafed until
ammunition was exhausted.  An Army pilot may have had this mission in
mind when he came back to report that he and his wingman had literally
cut a bloody X on the water through which Japanese troops were wading
towards land.  Two hours later, two P-400's returned to destroy most of
the supplies in the landing craft which had grounded on a reef close
inshore.

The Tasimboko operation-or, rather, raid-occurred on 8 Sep 42.
Beginning at 0700 hours, four P-400's and three SBD's bombed the area
for 10 minutes, with the object of pinning down the defenders while
the assault party went ashore.  At 0900 hours the mission was repeated.
At 1200 hours help was again requested, the Marines having tackled a
rather larger force than had been anticipated, and the P-400's
responded at once.  Nevertheless, at 1530 hours the Marines asked that
the P-400's cover their withdrawal.

Meanwhile, intermittent thundershowers had made 6-inch (15.2 cm) mud of
Henderson Field's runway.  Three of the P-400's were in commission and
the pilots taxied them out.  Captain Brannon lowered half flaps, held
the brakes, and gave his engine full throttle.  The plane crept forward.
He wrestled it down the runway and staggered off.  Less fortunate,
Lieutenant V.L. Head lurched and skidded trying to pick up speed, muddy
spray drenching the plane as it plowed through pools of water.  Torque
almost pulled it off the strip.  Realizing he was running out of runway,
the pilot tried to "hang it on the prop."  The old P-400 stalled and
hit, broke in three, and caught fire.  Lieutenant Head was able to get
out, though badly burned.

The third pilot took off through the flame and smoke.  For 2 hours this
lone pair of Army flyers covered the Marine withdrawal, doing lazy
eights over the beach while the boats were loaded and launched.  When
the last had got away, the P-400's came in on reserve gasoline and
somehow in the twilight got down on the strip.

By the time the Tasimboko raiders had returned, the Japanese were ready
for a major attempt on the Marine positions.  Their Express had been
running regularly; their strength had been built to a peak.  The Marine
air establishment at Henderson Field was being whittled by operational
losses and the necessity of daily interception.  On 9 Sep 42, the
F4F-4's were down to 11.

Date:    Mon, 4 Mar 1996 20:37:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Guadalcanal Air War 4/6

LUNGA RIDGE

In anticipation of enemy thrusts, Marine air strength was substantially
augmented on 11 Sep and additional planes came in on the 13th.  By the
12th the Japanese had prepared a formidable push against the perimeter
defense of the airfield.  Bombers hit at Henderson Field by day and
cruisers and destroyers from the Express shelled it by night.  A
particularly heavy shelling occurred during the night of 13 Sep,
supporting a three-pronged assault on the Marines.  Two of the attacks
were held, but the most vicious struck at the Lunga Ridge just south of
the airfield, a position held by Colonel Merritt A. Edson's 1st Raider
Battalion.  All night the Japanese drove against the ridge.  Colonel
Edson's men were forced off the crest and down on the other side.  Only
the inner perimeter defense stood between the air strip and the enemy.
Snipers broke through and the field was brought under mortar and
artillery fire.  Radio Tokyo announced that Guadalcanal was retaken.

The 67th Fighter Squadron mustered three of its P-400's to aid the
Marine counterattack on 14 Sep.  At 0730 hours Captain Thompson and
Lieutenants B.W. Brown and B.E. Davis were dispatched to "Bloody Ridge."
They did not have to fly to an objective; they simply circled the field,
visible at all times to their ground crews except when they dipped
behind the low hill.  Then the murderous chatter of their armament could
be heard.  They made repeated passes until enemy rifle and machine-gun
fire forced two of them down in dead-stick landings; the last simply
ran out of ammunition.  The Marines retook the hill and buried the enemy
dead with a bulldozer.

It was clear that the Japanese had shot their bolt in the night attack
of 13 Sep.  The American lodgment on Guadalcanal had survived another
push.

By now, the maligned P-400 had proved itself.  General Vandegrift
consistently used the plane against any position blocking his Marines--
in fact, he even asked for more P-400's.  COMAIRSOPAC's chief of staff,
Captain  Matt Gardner, testified to its effectiveness in strafing troops
and landing barges.  The Marines preferred to use their SBD's against
the reinforcing vessels.  The P-400 had found in ground-air cooperation
its niche on Guadalcanal.

In defiance of technical orders, the 67th Fighter Squadron developed
its own technique of dive bombing.  On the plane's instrument panel was
the warning: "Do not release bomb when nose angle 30 degrees up or down
or when airspeed exceeds 280 m.p.h. (451 km/h)"  The Jagdstaffel
discovered that the bomb would release at 70 degrees and clear the
propeller arc if a quick pressure on the stick was employed to pull the
airplane away from the falling bomb.  Dives averaged 300 mph (483
km/h) and sometimes reached 500 mph (805 km/h).  Unlike the SBD's, which
pushed over at 15,000 to 17,000 feet (4,572 to 5,182 m), the P-400's
started their dives at 5,000 feet (1,524 m), released and pulled out
right over the jungle, zig-zagging over the palms to avoid ground fire
and returning to strafe where the latter revealed troop positions.

The cover offered by the jungle and coconut groves effectively concealed
the Japanese and distressed the Jagdstaffel, which often could not find
the target or believe it had caused damage.  Marine outposts reported
enemy concentrations, which were shown the pilots on a map and indicated
by panels in American-held territory.  The P-400's dive-bombed the spot
and came back to strafe blindly among the trees.  Only occasionally did
they catch a fleeting glimpse of the Japanese.  However, the infantry,
moving in, found bodies in abundance and sometimes silenced mortars, and
captured diaries testified to the Japanese trooper's great fear of the
"long-nosed American planes."  The Marine and Navy intelligence officers
who briefed and interrogated the 67th Fighter Squadron employed this
evidence to encourage the Army pilots, and the Jagdstaffel took heart.

HENDERSON FIELD'S COMBAT ROUTINE

The routine of combat at Henderson Field began around 1200 hours.  Enemy
bombers would arrive, 18 to 24 strong, high in the sun in a perfect V of
V's, escorted by 20 or more Zekes in flights of three.  Coming down from
Kahili field on Bougainville or Buka field on Buka Island, the formation
would bend its course around the islands to avoid being spotted.  Some
150 miles (278 km) out of Henderson Field it would reach altitude, then
come in fast-perhaps as fast as 250 mph (402 km/h).

As the warning came through, a captured Rising Sun flag, the signal to
scramble, would shoot up at the pagoda.  Every flyable aircraft would
head through the craters for the runway.  If the crews noticed a wind
drop amid the dust, they knew the plane had run afoul of a dud hole or a
small crater hidden in the tall grass.  First planes on the runway took
off first, two at a time-SBD's or P-400's.  Once aloft, the F4F's,
test-firing, would climb for altitude while the SBD's and P-400's flew
off to work over Japanese territory.  The ground crews worked until the
black flag went up; then they'd hit the foxholes.

The 67th Fighter Squadron's ground crews shared the Marines' hardships
on Guadalcanal, even voluntarily manning the forward foxholes on nights
when a break-through seemed imminent.  There were not enough of them for
the job; they had few tools, no hoist equipment, no new parts.  Only
seven armorers had accompanied the original 14 planes.  Refueling in
particular was a back-breaking job.  Crew chiefs regularly slept under
the P-400's-in case individual Japanese were able to slip through the
Marine lines.  Nothing but combat materiel had accompanied the first
flights to Guadalcanal.

After their repulse on Lunga Ridge, the Japanese evidently retired to
give the Guadalcanal problem some thought.  The elements of their
solution, however, did not at once differ importantly from the familiar
pattern.  The Tokyo Express still ran and air raids on Henderson Field
continued, as did the knife work in the bush and the activities of
"Maytag Mike."  It was clear that decisive naval actions and the landing
of heavy reinforcements were necessary to secure the Guadalcanal-Tulagi
Island area.  These were in the offing, but not immediately.  The
Marines, reinforced by a large convoy on 18 Sep, made their
preparations.  The 11th Bomb Group on Espiritu Santo Island and the 67th
Fighter Squadron at Henderson Field carried on.

THE OCTOBER CRISIS

In retrospect Oct 42 was the crucial month in the Solomon Islands.
Though initially surprised, the Japanese had reacted vigorously to the
American thrust.  To begin with, off Savo Island their guns uncovered
the Marine lodgments.  Next, to exploit this advantage, they dispatched
in late Aug a powerful task force which the Navy turned back in the
Battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands.  The Japanese gradually built up
strength which they expended at Lunga Ridge in mid-Sep.  Oct 42 saw the
near-triumph of their tactics; they all but broke the American forces on
Guadalcanal.

On 26 Sep, when the correspondent Richard Tregaskis departed
Guadalcanal, be first went north to Bougainville Island in an Army B-17.
The plane probably belonged to Colonel Sunders' 11th Bomb Group,
although a new squadron, the 72d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) of the 5th
Bombardment Group (Heavy), had recently arrived in the area.  Tregaskis
furnished a good description of a routine B-17 search mission.

The B-17 he was in left Guadalcanal towards dawn and headed over Tulagi
Bay for the northwest.  The navigator, explaining that no excitement was
imminently likely, took off his shirt to acquire a tan.  Not until the
plane turned on a Bougainville Island bearing was the first enemy
aircraft seen.  Two Zekes made a tentative pass.  Later an enemy cargo
ship went into violent maneuvers as the B-17 approached.  A Rufe got too
close and the .50-caliber (12.7 mm) sent her down for a dead-stick
landing.  Meanwhile, the navigator counted and identified the ships
below and the bombardier decided that the flak which thwacked against
the fuselage was from naval guns.  Another Zeke made a single frontal
attack on the B-17 without either aircraft sustaining damage.  The rest
of the journey back to Espiritu Santo Island was without incident.

Throughout Sep and Oct, such missions were the principal occupation of
Colonel Saunders' command, in order to keep COMSOPAC informed of enemy
surface movements.  Statistics of operations for those months reveal
twice as many search as bombing sorties.  From Espiritu Santo Island the
sectors fanned northwesterly in narrow arcs of 6 degrees each and
extended approximately 800 miles (1,482 km) with a 100-mile (185 km)
width at the extremity.  The maximum coverage included Rekata Bay on
Santa Isabel Island and Gizo Island Bay in the New Georgia Islands.
When possible to stage through Henderson Field, the range increased-to
the Buin, Bougainville Island-Faisi, Shortland Island area-where the
bombers could keep an eye on freight moving down from Rabaul, New
Britain Island or the Mandated islands.  These were long flights,
averaging more than 1,500 miles (2,778 km)-12 weary hours for the crews.

Occasionally, the B-17s went even farther-to Kieta on Bougainville
Island's eastern shore and then around to touch the Buka Passage
between Buka and Bougainville Islands.  On such lengthy missions it was
not always possible to carry bombs, but extra fuel and reduced bomb
loads were the rule.  Targets abounded-at Bougainville's lower tip,
where the harbor of Tonolei and Buin settlement lay behind densely
wooded Shortland Island, and in The Slot, funneling down to Guadalcanal
between the New Georgia Islands and Santa Isabel and Choiseul Islands to
the east.  Tonolei, Bougainville Island, protected by Kahili Field,
received shipping from Rabaul, New Britain Island; Palau Island; and
Truk Island, while sightings in The Slot included every category in the
Japanese Navy.

DESTROYERS HARD TO HIT

Unfortunately, it was not easy to hit stripping.  Destroyers were most
numerous in The Slot, but they were extremely maneuverable and almost
defied direct hits.  The slower cargo vessels, offering easier targets,
were nevertheless far from sitting ducks for a single search plane.
Infrequently, a task force was sighted-battleships, cruisers, and
escorts-and on 14 Sep, 250 miles (463 km) north of the Santa Cruz group,
seven B-17's uncovered such a force-three battleships, four heavy
cruisers, and a number of lighter craft moving to the northwest.
Through intense and accurate flak, two possible hits were claimed.

Weather remained a formidable enemy, aborting a strike on 11 Sep by
seven B-17s against a sizeable naval force at Tonolei, Bougainville
Island and again turning back 15 B-17's tracking a carrier reported
northeast of the Santa Cruz Islands.  In this last search three B-17s
crash-landed at sea.  Two of the crews reached the northern tip of New
Caledonia Island and were later rescued.  The third drifted 7 days at
sea, lost two of its members to exposure, was finally rescued by the
Navy.

By 20 Sep 42, the 11th Bomb Group had sighted 155 vessels of all types
during 7 weeks of operation.  It had bombed 19 and hit 4.  Of these, 2
were sunk.  The scale of attack was always light; 1 attack by 4 planes;
4 by 3; 4 by 2; and 10 by single search planes.

To increase the striking power of the B-17's, another squadron was
dispatched from Hawaii in mid-Sep.  Necessary maintenance personnel
moved out of Oahu on 21 Sep in Consolidated LB-30's-early versions of
the Liberator.  By 23 Sep the B-17E's of the 5th Bombardment Group's
72d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) had arrived in Espiritu Santo Island
and on 24 Sep some of them were already up over Shortland Island.  In
mid-Oct, two additional squadrons of the 5th Bomb Group were dispatched
to the South Pacific.  For all practical purposes, the 5th Bomb Group's
squadrons operated as part of the 11th Bomb Group, an arrangement
recognized in Dec 42 by the establishment of a Joint headquarters for
the two groups.

"Eager" was the adjective for the pilots of the 11th Bomb Group, who
showed a reckless tendency to use the big bombers as attack planes.  The
gunners were fond of strafing and the pilots obligingly took the B-17's
down over the ground and dock installations at Gizo Island or over the
float planes and flying boats at Rekata Bay, Santa Isabel Island.  On
16 Sep, five separate strafing attacks were run over Rekata Bay and 3
days later the docks at Gizo Island were treated similarly.  Such
employment of heavy bombers disturbed General Harmon and he informed
headquarters that he was putting a curb to such activities.

The over-all tactical situation at Guadalcanal determined, that is,
limited, the effectiveness of General Harmon's heavy bombers.  Although
a B-17 had come in to stay overnight as early as 25 Aug, Henderson Field
was never stocked with enough fuel to permit continuous operations by
B-17's.  It was not stocked with fuel because the enemy controlled the
waters of the Lower Solomon Islands.  The Tokyo Express ran often, fast,
and in considerable strength.  One way to hamper the Express was to hit
hard at Tonolei, Bougainville Island and Buka Island, but the gasoline
for these missions had to be picked up at Henderson Field, and Henderson
Field ordinarily lacked it, until after the middle of Nov 42.

Moreover, the field, shelled almost nightly and bombed almost daily,
was too exposed for heavy bombers and suffered as well from lack of
service personnel.  During the first 3 months of the campaign the
Marines cheerfully took on a great part of the burden of servicing the
B-17's which came in from time to time.  By Oct Henderson Field had its
Marston mat, but General Harmon doubted that the field could support
heavy-bomber operations.  Taxiways and hard standings were lacking,
dispersion was poor, and rain was likely to bring operations to a soggy
halt.

Nevertheless, in the first part of Oct 42, an attempt was made to
restrict the use of Buka Island, which the Japanese employed as an
advanced staging point for Rabaul, New Britain Island-based bombers.
As early as 2 Sep, 40 bombers and fighters had been reported on the
field.  On 4 Oct, only one B-17 could bore through the weather to drop
a score of 100-pounders (45 kg) on the strip and parkways.  Eight days
later, another mission hit the field more solidly; the bombs splashed
along the runway and io parked aircraft were assessed as destroyed.
Only two Zekes rose from the surprised airdrome and only one got back.
On the 13th 6 more B-17s repeated the mission, putting 6 tons (5,443 kg)
on the Buka strip.  The day when the Guadalcanal gasoline supply could
back up a sustained offensive still lay in the future.

During late Sep and early Oct 42, the Japanese continued to run the
Express, filtering reinforcements into Guadalcanal at a low but steady
rate.  Marine air at Henderson Field enjoyed only limited success in
coping with it.  The Express did not get within range until late
afternoon; ordinarily only one strike could be accomplished before
nightfall and weather often interfered, but whenever moon and clouds
permitted, the dive and torpedo bombers roared out for night attacks.
Back at Espiritu Santo Island, Colonel Saunders found himself at a more
serious disadvantage; by the time his B-17's could cover the distance to
Guadalcanal, the Express would be out of range and dispersed up The
Slot.

On 5 Oct, another method of derailing the Express was tried. The
aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8) was dispatched to the north of the
Solomon Islands chain.  Her aircraft struck at Kieta, Bougainville
Island and depots in the Shortland Island area, and at Faisi, Shortland
Island hit hard at a naval force preparing for a southward voyage.
Still that night the Express made its run, and on succeeding nights as
well.  But on 11 Oct it met disaster at the other end of the line.

CAPE ESPERANCE

Army reinforcements were moving up to Guadalcanal in the second week of
Oct 42.  Partly to cover the flank of this convoy, but expressly to seek
battle with Japanese units on the Guadalcanal run, a task force under
Rear Admiral Norman Scott went hunting in the Solomon Islands.  The
eyes of this force were the B-17's covering Bougainville's southern tip.

Current search routine of the B-17's was roughly as follows.  Four
planes departed daily from Espiritu Santo Island and Henderson Field.
Those from Espiritu Santo Island took off at 0500 hours, searched 1,000
miles (1,852 km) between 294 and 324 degrees, then landed at Henderson
Field.  Next morning, out of Guadalcanal, these same B-17s covered an
arc 450 miles (833 km) between 300 and 340 degrees, flying to within 50
miles (93 km) of Rabaul, on New Britain Island.  Weather permitting,
this was efficient coverage.  To hinder such activity, the Japanese
brought a fresh and highly trained fighter unit into the Shortland
Island area.  On occasion, the B-17's went farther afield, on 20 Oct to
Kapingamarangi (Greenwich) Island, where photos were taken and the area
strafed.

On 11 Oct, Admiral Scott's cruiser force, the heavy cruisers USS San
Francisco (CA-38) and USS Salt Lake City (CA-25) and light cruisers USS
Helena (CL-50) and USS Boise (CL-47) with attendant destroyers, cruised
off Rennell Island, out of range of Japanese air search but within 5
hours' steaming of Savo Island.  At 1345 hours, Henderson Field reported
search planes had discovered two cruisers and six destroyers southbound
down The Slot.  Further information on Japanese naval movement was
denied by intensive air raids on Henderson Field during the afternoon.
Calculating that the enemy should be off Savo Island an hour before
midnight, Admiral Scott bore north, expecting to meet only the force
reported during the early afternoon.  Although the enemy's armada proved
considerably more substantial, that fact served only to increase
Japanese losses in the night action which succeeded.  The Battle of Cape
Esperance cost the Imperial Navy two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser,
five destroyers, and an auxiliary; another heavy cruiser and various
destroyers were damaged.  Our own losses were 175 killed and a number
wounded.  The destroyer USS Duncan (DD-485) was lost.

Cape Esperance not only failed to stop the Express; it hardly gave it
pause.  However, 4,000 U. S. Army troops of Major General Alexander M.
Patch's Americal Division were subsequently put ashore in time to face
the Japanese fury, which thenceforth increased in scale and
effectiveness.  The enemy was working up to another big push.  He began
by virtually knocking out the Guadalcanal airdrome.

At Henderson Field, the 67th Fighter Squadron had been continuing its
strafing and bombing.  New pilots had arrived; most of the original
group were dead or back in the rear areas.  New planes, P-39D-1-BE's
and P-39K's, were coming in, being assembled, tested, and flown up to
Guadalcanal-just as the old P-400's had made the journey in Aug.

The 9th of Oct was a routine day.  The field was muddy.  Six P-400's
were scheduled for a mission against the Kokumbona area to the west.
Taxiing in the mud, one P-400 broke off a nose wheel; another sustained
two flat tires; a third simply got stuck.  Still another plane proved to
have a rough engine.  The remaining P-400's bombed and strafed for an
hour near a bridge west of Kokumbona and at 1100 hours four pilots
returned to bomb.  The enemy air raid at Tojo Time failed to
materialize.  Earlier in the day, the new P-39's had made their debut
up in the New Georgia Island area, accompanying SBD's in an attack on
Japanese ships.  Of the float planes sent up to interfere, the P-39's
shot down one certain and two probables without loss to themselves.
Late in the afternoon, the P-39's, using 100-pound (45 kg) incendiaries
and demolition bombs, worked over the Marovovo district of Guadalcanal
beyond Cape Esperance.

In the succeeding 3 days the pattern was largely repeated.  On the 10th,
the P-39's went twice up to the New Georgia Island area as escort for
SBD's on ship strikes.  On the 11th, the 67th Fighter Squadron lost one
pilot and was credited with 1 bomber in a scrap with 30 bombers and 20
Zekes carrying out the usual noon-hour raid.  On the 12th, ground troops
were again harassed; the P-39's flew top cover for Grumman TBF Avengers
and SBD's which went up after 3 destroyers in The Slot; and 2 P-39's
cracked up in take-offs from the muddy field.  On this day, however, a
new note was added: a Japanese field piece began dropping shells in the
dispersal area.

Date:    Mon, 4 Mar 1996 20:38:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Guadalcanal Air War 5/6

HENDERSON FIELD KNOCKED OUT

Admiral Scott had chastened the Express on the night of the 11th.
Colonel Saunders' B-17's, returning from Buka Island Island north of
Bougainville Island on 13 Oct, stopped over at Tonolei, Bougainville
Island long enough to score a direct hit on a transport and shoot down 6
of 26 attacking fighters.  The Americal Division's 164th Infantry
Regiment was disembarking at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal.  (The 164th
Infantry was a North Dakota National Guard unit that had been inducted
into federal service on 10 Feb 41.)

The morning of 13 Oct the 67th Fighter Squadron attacked landing barges
which the enemy had beached during the night at the western end of
Guadalcanal.  At 1200 hours the air raid came.  The Mitsubishi G4M1,
Navy Type 1 Attack Bombers (Bettys) were scarcely intercepted.  The
P-400's watched the show above from 12,000 feet (3,658 m); the P-39's
struggled to 27,000 feet (8,230 m) and still were 3,000 feet (914 m)
low; and insufficient warning prevented the F4F's from making contact in
force.  At 1400 hours, while the fighters sat being refueled and
rearmed, another wave of Japanese bombers made an appearance and was
able to bomb at will, damaging aircraft at Henderson Field and causing
casualties among the 164th Infantry, still moving ashore.

More serious, the Japanese field piece had again begun to lob shells-
this time into the area around the end of the runway.  The Seabees of
the 6th Construction Battalion had been racing up and down the strip
with pre-cut Marston mat and preloaded dump trucks prepared for the
expected craters, but their efforts had barely kept the field in
operation.  Pilots and mechanics were crawling from their foxholes to
ready the P-400's for another mission-to track down "Pistol Pete," as
the gun had already been named.  Suddenly the mission was called off-no
gasoline!

Just before 2400 hours came the main event.  First the noise of a small
plane overhead.  Then three flares, a red one for the west end of the
runway, green for the east, and white in the center.  The men were
scarcely in the foxholes when bedlam broke loose.  Off Guadalcanal
stood an Express consisting of 2 battleships, 1 light cruiser, and 8
destroyers.  For over 2 hours the bombardment continued.  Runway and
dispersal area were brought under fire; after a thorough pattern
shelling, the enemy shifted to the camp sites in the palm grove.
Gasoline and ammunition dumps took hits and all over the field aircraft
went up in smoke and flame.  For whole minutes the area was bright as
day from the flares.

The Japanese let up long enough to cool their guns, then it began again.
At 0315 hours, the Express stood for home.  Three bombers came overhead
and dropped their sticks; then three more; and so on until dawn.

The morning of 14 Oct lit up a shambles.  Tents were collapsed or
shrapnel-riddled.  The aerial defenses were seriously reduced; in all,
57 aircraft had been destroyed or damaged.  To meet the Express, four
SBD's remained, but no TBF's; to meet the Tojo Time raid, only a few
F4F's.  The 67th Fighter Squadron had been fortunate-two P-39's damaged
and none of the P-400's even hit.  A few barrels of aviation gasoline
remained.  On 13 Oct Colonel Saunders' B-17's had been bombing over Buka
Island and Tonolei, Bougainville Island, had returned to Henderson
Field, where two of the B-17s were so sieved that night by shrapnel that
they had to be abandoned.

In the midst of the post-raid rubble and confusion, Colonel Saunders led
out his remaining B-17's.  Less than 2,000 feet (610 m) of Henderson
Field's runway was usable, but the bombers took off for Espiritu Santo
Island in 1,800 feet (549 m), drawing 70 inches of pressure without a
cylinder blowing out.  On instructions from Marine headquarters,
officers of the 67th Fighter Squadron went through the two derelict
B-17's, destroying radios, maps, charts, and confidential papers, and
hiding the Norden bombsights.  For the time Henderson Field was useless
as a heavy bombardment base.

In fact, Henderson Field was very nearly useless for any type of
aircraft.  Pistol Pete-actually a number of guns-went into action again.
His range, short at first, improved with practice, most of the shells
landing in the area where the 67th Fighter Squadron's planes were
parked.  They came irregularly, about two every quarter-hour.  As fast
as the Seabees tackled 1 crater, another shell would whine over and dig
at the same spot, scattering men and equipment.  Still the Seabees
tamped, filled, and laid mat, and for a time kept part of the field in
operation.  Providentially, back in Sep, they had laid out a grass strip
2,000 yards (1,829 m) distant from and parallel with Henderson Field;
although rough and short, this strip supported the light planes during
the critical mid-Oct days.

In an effort to silence Pete, four P-400's were hung with 100-pound (45
kg) bombs.  The pilots, parachutes strapped on, crouched in nearby
foxholes.  One at a time, between the bursts, they ran for their planes.
Drunkenly, they taxied out, careened down the runway with new craters
pocking the surface behind them.  All got off but failed to silence
Pistol Pete, who was numerous, concealed, and frequently moved.  Lack
of fuel precluded further raids against him; every drop was saved for
fighter defense.

Enemy pressure was relentless.  At 1154 hours and again at 1303 hours,
enemy bombers and fighters struck, without warning or interception.
Bomb craters could be filled, but the Seabees fell behind in their race
with Pete.  By afternoon of 14 Oct Henderson Field Field was knocked
out.  Down from headquarters, shortly after 1200 hours, came a Marine
colonel.  His words were reminiscent of the Philippines:

   We don't know whether we'll be able to hold the field or not.
   There's a Japanese task force of destroyers, cruisers, and troop
   transports headed our way.  We have enough gasoline left for one
   mission against them.  Load your airplanes with bombs and go out
   with the dive bombers and hit them.  After the gasoline is gone we'll
   have to let the ground troops take over.  Then your officers and
   men will attach yourselves to some infantry outfit. Good luck and
   good-bye.

At 1425 hours, then, 4 P-39's, each with a 300-pound (136 kg) bomb, and
3 old P-400's with 100-pounders (45 kg) took off with the 4 SBD's.
Henderson Field had few teeth left to show the Express.  One hundred
and fifty miles (278 km) of precious fuel was burned before the planes
sighted the Japanese task force off the coast of Santa Isabel Island-6
transports in line astern, well screened by 8 destroyers and cruisers,
4 on each flank.  The armada maneuvered violently, threw up heavy flak.
The composite attack group pushed over and went down.  No planes were
lost but no hits were seen.

Someone recalled the abandoned B-17's.  The gasoline siphoned out of
their tanks proved enough for one more strike, and for this one old
P-400, saddled with 500-pound (227 kg) bombs, barely wobbled off the
runway.  This time the SBD's scored two hits on the Japanese force, by
now at the near tip of Santa Isabel Island.  The 67th Fighter Squadron
lost one plane over the target, and another to a night-landing crash
back at Henderson Field.

It was a glum prospect as darkness set in over the Marine beachhead.
Another shelling was a certainty.  The enemy ships were anchored between
Kokumbona and Tassafaronga, Guadalcanal, only 10 miles (18 km) down the
channel, busily unloading troops and supplies-a prime target for an air
strike, but no gasoline.  However, the shelling which started at 0100
hours, though heavy, lasted but a short time, newly arrived PT boats out
in "Sleepless Lagoon" contributing to the premature withdrawal of the
Express.  [Motor Torpedo Squadron THREE (MTBRon 3) had arrived on Tulagi
Island on the night of 11/12 Oct.]  And gasoline was on the way.

By mid-morning it began to arrive, ferried in by the work-horse Douglas
C-47/R4D.  For over a week Henderson Field was to depend on the fuel
brought in by this service, maintained by two Marine transport squadrons
and the USAAF's 13th Troop Carrier Squadron stationed at Plaines des
Gaiacs, New Caledonia Island.  [One of the Marine squadrons was Marine
Utility Squadron TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (VMJ-253) on New Caledonia.]
All day long on 15 Oct the transports came in from Espiritu Santo
Island, each with about 12 drums-enough to keep 12 planes in the air for
1 hour. They braked to a skidding stop, the drums were rolled out, and
the planes took off before Pistol Pete could lob a shell.

HENDERSON FIELD STRIKES BACK

With gasoline on band, Henderson Field prepared to hit back.  Battered
planes were patched, pilots belted their own ammunition, armament crews
shouldered the formidable task of bombing up the planes without bomb
carts.  Ten men hoisted a 500-pound (227 kg) bomb on a truck bed.
Hauled to the vicinity of the plane, then rolled through the mud, the
bombs were lifted and fitted into the racks by as many men as could
crowd under the aircraft's belly.  All this on empty stomachs-with the
cooks in the foxholes, it had been hardtack and cold hash since 13 Oct.

Down the beach were numerous targets.  Between Kokumbona and Doma Reef,
Guadalcanal, five transports and eight destroyers were pouring ashore
upwards of 10,000 troops.  No infiltration this, but invasion in force,
with a constant patrol of Zekes over the ships.  All day on 15 Oct, the
Henderson Field aircraft smashed at the convoy.

No sooner were the planes airborne than objectives were visible, and
waiting Zekes swept down on the Army and Marine planes starting their
dives.  The destroyers contributed heavy flak.  In this situation, the
technique of the P-39's and P-400's shaped up somewhat as follows: they
tried to disregard enemy fighters, dived, released when the ship was
dead center in the gun sight, pulled out over the mast, and zigzagged
out of the ack-ack.  Then to Henderson Field for another load.

Results were encouraging.  One of the 67th Fighter Squadron's pilots got
a probable, two other scored hits which damaged two transports; still
another dropped on a transport which caught fire, exploded, and sank.
The air score was even-one Zeke for one pilot of the 67th Fighter
Squadron.  Altogether the fighter squadron sent three missions up the
beach on 15 Oct, and in addition weathered the usual high-level Tojo
Time raid.

The B-17s also had a hand in the battle.  On 14 Oct, six had come up
from Espiritu Santo Island to pound the Express, but lost it in the
darkness of Indispensable Strait.  On 15 Oct, 11 of them, now back,
possibly damaged a transport and fired what was thought to be a light
cruiser.  Of the 20 Zekes covering the landing operation, the bombers
knocked down nearly half, and though many sustained major damage, all
the B-17s made the 640 miles (1,185 km) back to Espiritu Santo Island.

The night of 15 Oct Henderson Field Field absorbed a shelling by a
cruiser, but in the morning the enemy task force had left.  Three of its
transports lay blazing hulks on the beach, but troops, armament, and
supplies had gone ashore.  Harassment of these reinforcements became a
principal mission of the Henderson Field-based aircraft.  As often as
they could be refueled and rearmed, P-39's, P-400's, and SBD's went down
to Kokumbona, Guadalcanal.  The F4F-4's made the daily Japanese raids a
costly business; on 23 Oct, for instance, 24 F4F's, intercepting 16
bombers and 25 fighters, shot down 20 Zekes and 2 bombers with no
losses.

These days, prelude to a big enemy push, were utter weariness to the
67th Fighter Squadron.  Repeated missions multiplied the work of men
forced by repeated bombings and shellings to spend most of their time in
foxholes.  Sleep and sufficient food were always lacking.  Planes were
wearing out.  One day, four P-400's took the air.  The first had a bomb,
but only one .30-caliber (7.62 mm) machine gun functioning; number two
had a bomb and no functioning armament, numbers three and four had most
of their guns in commission, but no bombs.  Personnel cracked under the
strain.  On 18 Oct, officers and men, affected by repeated bombings,
were evacuated to New Caledonia.

Apparently the Japanese were sanguine of the outcome; their German
allies announced that two important airfields had been captured from
U.S. forces in the Solomon Islands.  In Washington, Secretary Knox
hinted at the seriousness of the situation.  The main strip at Henderson
Field was only recurrently in operation despite prodigious efforts to
erase the pockmarks.  Up in the northern Solomon Islands the Japanese
marshaled cargo and warships and the Express ran on the nights of the
16, 18, and 20 Oct-destroyers and cruisers feeding the units ashore with
foreboding regularity.  The new COMSOPAC, Admiral  William F. Halsey,
Jr., soberly prepared to counter a thrust by sea.

THE JAPANESE GRAND ASSAULT

Decision, however, was reached on land.  The Japanese plan envisaged
simultaneous attacks, eastward across the Matanikau and from a point
south of the airfield.  D-day was 23 Oct; for days before, patrols
probed the American lines.  But the grand assault, from the Japanese
point of view, was bungled; the attacks were delivered separately, and
separately they were beaten back.

The Matanikau River action proceeded on schedule, if not according to
plan.  Ten tanks and thousands of fresh troops, with ample artillery
support, were thrown against the defenders.  Four times on 23 Oct the
enemy lashed at positions held by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 5th
Marine Regiment.  American half-tracks mounting 75 mm cannon knocked out
the tanks one by one as they attempted to cross the Matanikau River, and
the Marines picked off about 2,000 Japanese troops.  Undaunted, the
enemy repeated the effort at dawn of 24 Oct.  The P-400's went over,
bombing and strafing the enemy lines, and all through the day recurrent
attacks were checked, although heavy afternoon rains grounded the
planes at Henderson Field.

At 0800 hours on 25 Oct, the men on Henderson Field Field were surprised
to find five Zekes circling above their strip, making no effort to
strafe.  Soon this number swelled to 14 and a medium bomber, all
awaiting the signal to land, apparently under the impression that the
field was in Japanese hands.  No signal came, and as soon as the mud had
dried sufficiently, eight F4F's left the field and shot down the whole
force.

The Express had put in an appearance during the early morning.  One
heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and four destroyers landed troops and
supplies and began to support with shellfire enemy attacks on the
embattled beachhead.  The SBD's and the 67th Fighter Squadron went after
this force, making four separate attacks.  At 1420 hours, Lieutenants
Dinn, Purnell, and Jacobsen in P-39's caught the ships northeast of
Florida Island, barely missing them with 500-pound (227 kg) bombs.  Two
hours later, these three and Captain Mitchell attacked once more,
Lieutenant Jacobsen putting his bomb squarely on the heavy cruiser.
Near misses on the light cruiser were obtained and the warships,
trailing oil slicks, moved slowly off.

On 25 Oct the enemy staged his attack from the south, striking along
Lunga Ridge.  Although the Marines and the 164th Infantry Regiment piled
the attackers six deep, a night assault broke through until some enemy
elements stood close to the south side of Henderson Field.  The morning
or 26 Oct a desperate American counterattack cleared the field.  Three
of the old P-400's and two P-39's did their bit, bombing and strafing
the area south of the grass fighter strip.  The counterattack of the
morning of 26 Oct, as it turned out, ended the Japanese threat by land,
but a major sea action was brewing.

In the Japanese plans, possession of Henderson Field Field was
apparently a prerequisite to a grand assault on Guadalcanal.  With the
strip harboring friendly carrier planes instead of the redoubtable
F4F's, SBD's, P-39's, and P-400's, additional troops could be safely
brought in for a mop-up.  The Japanese fleet, meanwhile, could be
expected to see that the American Navy did not interfere.  Appreciation
of the enemy intentions clarifies the role of the carrier action of 26
Oct, known as the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands.

ENEMY CONFIDENT

The success of their land drive on 25 Oct must have made the capture of
Henderson Field seem only a matter of hours to the Japanese, and down
from the Mandates moved a force formidable enough to clinch the
argument.  Admiral Halsey had scraped his Pacific resources to meet it.
The aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) and the new battleship USS
South Dakota (BB-57) were rushed down from Pearl Harbor, where the
former had been recovering from wounds received in the Battle of the
Eastern Solomon Islands.  With the aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8),
these two composed the nucleus of the force with which Rear Admiral
Thomas C. Kinkaid was skirting the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 Oct, ready
to intercept whatever enemy forces the Mandates might offer.

On that day the search planes, B-17's and PBY's, were out from Espiritu
Santo Island.  East of Malaita Island, Lieutenant Mario Sesso of the 5th
Bomb Group located one section of the Japanese force-which mustered four
carriers and four battleships, with a wealth of escort, transports, and
auxiliaries.  During a half-hour's observation Lieutenant Sesso
developed his report until it included a battleship, several cruisers,
destroyers, and a possible carrier.  Seven carrier-borne HIJMS Nagoya
Zekes attempted to interfere.  Two fell away smoking and one
disintegrated in a frontal attack.  The B-17 suffered failure of the
lower turret and loss of one gun in the tail, another in the upper
turret.  The Zekes killed the bombardier, but the B-17 came back and the
report got through to the fleet.

In the Santa Cruz action, the Japanese, by destroying USS Hornet,
reduced the American carriers in the South Pacific to the again damaged
USS Enterprise (CV-6).  They had sustained damage to two carriers
themselves, as well as to a Kongo class battleship, but it is unlikely
that this punishment prompted their withdrawal.  The American troops on
Guadalcanal stood fast; Henderson Field's aircraft could still hit at an
occupation force.  The Japanese, consistently enough, withdrew.  The
beachhead actually had saved itself.

Date:    Mon, 4 Mar 1996 20:39:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Guadalcanal Air War 6/6

THE SECURING OF GUADALCANAL

On one of the last days of Oct 42, the U.S. Navy's submarine USS
Amberjack (SS-219) slipped cautiously into Tulagi Island.  Her mission,
cargo, and passengers were not usual for a submarine, but well attuned
to the Solomon Islands campaign, in which almost anything was more than
likely to happen.  The Amberjack's spare fuel tanks carried aviation
gasoline-Henderson Field still suffered from insufficient gasoline.  She
carried torpedoes for the Tulagi Island-based PT boats-Guadalcanal still
suffered from the visits of the Express.  She carried, in addition,
USAAF personnel, 15 airplane mechanics and armorers for the worn 67th
Fighter Squadron-which had always suffered from lack of manpower.

After their big push the Japanese had receded somewhat and the situation
on Guadalcanal showed some improvement.  The Express still ran, although
harassed by the two dozen submarines COMSOPAC operated in the area and
by the pilots from Henderson Field, whose two strips had recovered from
the ravages of Oct.

General Vandegrift's Marines celebrated by striking across the Matanikau
River on 30 Oct.  For a change, American warships, the light cruiser USS
Atlanta (CL-51) and four destroyers, stood offshore in support.  By 3
Nov, the Marines were beyond Point Cruz.  However, on the night of 2
Nov, the industrious Japanese landed 1,500 men east of Koli Point and
the American push to the west was checked.  On 4 Nov, USS San Francisco,
(CA-38), USS Helena (CL-50), and the destroyer USS Sterett (DD-407)
obligingly shelled this force, which because of subsequent attentions by
the Marines never seriously threatened American positions.

The 67th Fighter Squadron was carrying the war to the enemy in its own
way.  On the 3 Nov, for instance, two pilots bombed AAA emplacements at
Kokumbona on Guadalcanal.  Two more were up over the hills on
reconnaissance, and, since intelligence had reported Japanese troops
east of the Tenaru River, the afternoon was devoted to bombing and
strafing this region.  The pilots went out in pairs, dropping 100- and
500-pound (45 and 227 kg) bombs, and returning with numerous bullet
holes in their craft.

The routine was not light.  Usually 4 or 5 missions were run, but on
some days the total might rise to 12 or more.  As the newer P-39's
arrived, they were frequently dispatched to escort Marine strike forces,
or as dive bombers in company with the SBD's.  One of the missions of 3
Nov had the following participants: 15 SBD's, 4 P-39's, 2 P-400's, 1
TBF, and 7 F4F's-all out after the Japanese who had come ashore near
Koli Point on Guadalcanal.  Such conglomerations constituted the primary
weapon against the Express.

The afternoon of 7 Nov, 11 southbound Japanese warships were sighted
northeast of Santa Isabel Island and the composite force went into
action.  Out from Henderson Field flew 7 SBD's with 1000-pounders
(454 kg), 3 torpedo-laden TBF's, and 8 P-39's lugging 500-pound (227 kg)
bombs, the whole escorted by 22 F4F's.  The Army pilots' instructions
specified they were first to bomb the warships, identified as 1 light
cruiser and 10 destroyers, pull out, and join the F4F's as high cover.
However, the P-39's were held up on the take-off and were overtaking the
rest of the formation when they saw 3 Rufes and 2 float biplanes about
to attack 2 F4F's.  Jettisoning their bombs, the P-39's shot down all 5.
Ahead, the strike was succeeding.  The TBF's put 2 torpedoes into the
cruiser and 1 into a destroyer, while the SBD's planted a 1,000-pounder
(454 kg) on the cruiser.  In the air battle, the enemy lost 15 float
planes, the Marines 4 F4F's.

The B-17's continued their searches from Espiritu Santo Island.  Daily
six were out, occasionally eight to provide a broader coverage.  Air
opposition had for the time diminished, but to vary the routine there
might be a surfaced sub to strafe or a flight of Rufes to dispute the
passage.  So far as bombing was concerned, without the necessary fuel at
Henderson Field the B-17's could not get up to the Buin and Tonolei area
on Bougainville Island from where the Japanese would mount any further
offensive.

JAPANESE PLAN OFFENSIVE

That the Japanese were contemplating such an offensive was obvious.  By
9 Nov, reports of concentrations began to come in.  As of 12 Nov, when
the battle was already under way, estimates put the enemy's strength at
two carriers, four battleships, five heavy cruisers, and all the escort
and shipping needed for a major attempt on Guadalcanal.  Against such a
force, Admiral Halsey's resources were slim, his principal units being
the apparently indestructible USS Enterprise (CV-6), under repair, the
battleships USS Washington (BB-56) and USS South Dakota (BB-57).
Additional complication was the fact that COMSOPAC was required not only
to turn the Japanese thrust but to put Army and Marine reinforcements on
Guadalcanal.  To aid the Guadalcanal garrison, these reinforcements had
to be landed on the island and unloaded before the Japanese boiled down
from Buin, Bougainville Island in any great strength.  Moreover, the
transports had to be safely removed again.  Time was extremely short and
the whole operation distinctly ticklish.  Fortunately, Admiral Turner,
in charge of supplying Guadalcanal, had developed a fairly accurate
estimate of the chronology of Japanese moves.  The predicted enemy
timetable ran somewhat like this: land-based bombing of Henderson Field
starting on 10 Nov; naval bombardment on the night of the 11th; a
carrier air attack on the field on the 12th, with naval bombardment and
landings that night.  The invasion force was expected on Friday 13 Nov.

Since the U.S. transports had to clear Guadalcanal by Thursday night,
cargo vessels were to be off Lunga Point at dawn of Wednesday, the 11th;
transports from Noumea, New Caledonia Island would arrive Thursday
morning.  The escorts of these groups, combined under Rear Admiral
Daniel J. Callaghan, were to deal with any Japanese naval force poking
around in Sleepless Lagoon.  A great deal depended on the speed of
unloading and on the Japanese doing nothing unexpected.

The cargo vessels moved in on schedule and commenced unloading.  At
0935 hours, they were attacked and slightly damaged by divebombing
Aichi D3A, Navy Type 99 Carrier Bombers (Vals), the Marines losing six
planes in the fight with bombers and escort.  At 1127 hours the high-
level raid occurred; eight of the 67th Fighter Squadron's pilots were
forced to sit this one out at 12,000 feet while the Marines went up to
destroy six of the raiders.  That night, Admiral Callaghan swept Savo
Island Sound without incident.

The American transports anchored off Kukum beach of Guadalcanal at 0530
hours on Thursday 12 Nov, screened by cruisers and destroyers.  At 1340
hours, on warning of an approaching enemy formation, the ships got under
way and formed in antiaircraft disposition.  High above the island,
concealed in a cloud, waited Captain Joe Foss and his F4F's.  Not far
below cruised eight P-39's ready, after their bombing and strafing
routine, for aerial combat.  The combination of naval antiaircraft guns
and Henderson Field's fighters proved lethal to the Japanese airmen.

At 1405 hours, upwards of 20 torpedo bombers appeared low from behind
Florida Island.  In a long line abreast, they headed for the transports,
eight Zekes covering.  Diving into the combat, the P-39's found their
canopies covered with mist as warmer air was reached, and one pilot,
blinded, continued down into the sea.  He was the 67th Fighter
Squadron's only loss as against one Zeke and one torpedo bomber to its
credit.  Altogether, three Zekes and one torpedo plane got away; none of
the American ships sustained serious damage.

Scout planes up The Slot, meanwhile, had discovered that the Japanese
were moving down a task force, probably with the intention of attacking
the transports off Guadalcanal, and towards evening the latter were
accordingly withdrawn.  Then Admiral Callaghan headed back for Savo
Island, where he fought against odds, one of the wildest night actions
in naval history.  Both sides suffered heavily, the Japanese more
heavily, and Henderson Field took no shelling that night.

AIR REINFORCEMENTS

Thus far the defense had succeeded, but the main Japanese onslaught had
not yet been met.  To counter it, USS Enterprise (CV-6), USS South
Dakota (BB-57), and USS Washington (BB-56) had moved out from Noumea,
New Caledonia Island on 11 Nov.  COMSOPAC began to concentrate land-
based aircraft on Guadalcanal.  Fresh SBD's, TBF's, and F4F's were flown
in and on 12 Nov, at 1530 hours, something new was added.  Eight
Lockheed P-38G Lightnings landed on the fighter strip just east of
Henderson Field.

There is a pleasant story about the advent of these P-38's.  It holds
that as the Marines on the field spotted the Army pilots climbing out of
their formidable fighters they cheered wildly and rushed out to greet
them-with reason, for old friends had come.  Leading the flight was
Major Dale Brannon, who back in Aug had brought the first P-400's, the
"klunkers," into the strip the Japanese had begun.  With him were other
former 67th Fighter Squadron pilots, veterans of the Jagdstaffel.

The eight P-38's belonged to the 339th Fighter Squadron, 347th Fighter
Group.  Late in Aug it had been decided to activate a fighter group in
New Caledonia, to comprise the 67th, 68th, and 70th Fighter Squadrons
and another yet to be activated.  By the end of Sep the orders had gone
out; on 3 Oct, the 347th Fighter Group and the 339th Fighter Squadron
were officially in existence.  As cadre for the 339th, the old 67th
Fighter Squadron provided 29 officers and 106 enlisted men, with Major
Brannon in command.  With him to the new organization passed the four
lieutenants who had accompanied him on the pioneer hop to Guadalcanal.
Command of the 67th Fighter Squadron went to Captain John A. Thompson,
who had headed the second flight Of P-400's from New Caledonia.

In Sep 42, General Harmon acquired P-38's diverted from Lieutenant
General George C. Kenney's Fifth Air Force in Australia.  These were
assigned to the 339th.  During Oct the Lightnings were held in New
Caledonia; training was not yet complete and frequency of naval
bombardments of Henderson Field too high to risk the new fighters on
Guadalcanal.  By mid-Nov, however, they were ready to move.

On the morning of 12 Nov, the P-38's had left Tontouta, New Caledonia
Island at 0700 hours, escorted by a B-17.  Upon landing at Espiritu
Santo Island after 3.5 hours' flight, mechanics discovered that low fuel
consumption would have permitted a non-stop flight to Guadalcanal.  The
pilots, however, already showed fatigue.  En route to Henderson Field,
radio report of an enemy attack was received, and the B-17 carrying the
ground personnel turned back at the southern end of San Cristobal
Island.  Consequently, when the planes landed, the Marines turned to and
serviced them.  On 13 Nov, additional USAAF reinforcements arrived:
eight P-38F's from the 39th Fighter Squadron, 35th Fighter Group, Fifth
Air Force, flying in nonstop from Milne Bay, New Guinea.

Dawn of Friday, 13 Nov found the Japanese battleship HIJMS Hiyei limping
northwest of Savo Island.  A casualty of the encounter with Admiral
Callaghan, she became the main preoccupation of the American planes in
the combat area.  First blood was drawn by the USS Enterprise (CV-6),
which was cruising south of Guadalcanal with a damaged No. 1 elevator.
The carrier decided to ease operations by sending some of her planes to
Henderson Field.  Nine TBF's and six fighters flew off and at 1100 hours
sighted HIJMS Hiyei, a light cruiser, and four destroyers headed for
Guadalcanal, perhaps to finish off USS Portland (CA-33), lying off Lunga
Point.  The TBF's promptly put three fish into the battleship.

Shortly afterward 17 B-17's arrived.  These had departed Espiritu
Santo Island at 0500 hours and had subsequently been ordered to attack
a carrier and a battleship reported by a search B-17.  The indicated
targets were out of range and the bombers proceeded to Guadalcanal,
where they found HIJMS Hiyei, circling slowly with her escorts.  Despite
heavy AAA fire, one sure hit was obtained and five probables.  All day
long Marine and Navy aircraft at Guadalcanal hammered the Hiyei, the
67th Fighter Squadron providing top cover with four of its planes.  By
evening, however, the battleship was still afloat.

It is probable that the Hiyei was towed into position to assist in the
bombardment of Henderson Field that night.  The shelling, carried out by
destroyers and cruisers as well, lasted 8o minutes until interrupted by
the PT boats from Tulagi Island.  On the field, one SBD and two F4F-4's
were destroyed and 17 F4F-4's damaged.  The 67th Fighter Squadron seemed
to be the main target, every salvo but one landing near its camp at the
north end of the fighter strip.  Sixteen planes had been in commission
the evening before; only one now remained, "the Resurrection, the
oldest, most beat-up klunker on the field."  Affording some consolation,
nothing but an enormous oil slick suggested the Hiyei on 14 Nov.
Whether at this point the Japanese supposed Henderson Field had been
knocked out, as it had virtually been knocked out by similar shellings
in Oct, or thought that the American Navy was too weak to interfere, or
accepted a combination of these hypotheses, is unknown.  At any rate,
Japanese transports which had been hovering in the Upper Solomons
finally reversed course and came on for Guadalcanal.

CONCENTRATE OF JAPANESE CONVOY

On 14 Nov COMSOPAC directed USS Enterprise (CV-6) to attack these
transports and as additional striking power the B-26's of the 70th
Bombardment Squadron (Medium) were sent up to Guadalcanal.  Under Major
Leroy L. Stefanowicz, ten Marauders, in company with four P-38's, left
Plaines des Gaiacs, New Caledonia Island at 0800 hours.  At Espiritu
Santo Island, the bombers were refueled and took off, disappearing in
the clouds before the P-38's could be readied for flight.  Meanwhile,
during the morning, the planes of USS Enterprise (CV-6) and Marine
flyers from Henderson Field struck at the warships, now retiring to the
north, whose shells had wrought such havoc with the 67th Fighter
Squadron the previous night.

At 0830 hours, General Harmon had reported that his search B-17's had
sighted the Japanese convoy-cargo ships and transports, twelve of them
20 miles (37 km) north of New Georgia Island.  The escort consisted of a
near-dozen warships never positively identified.  In addition, there was
an advance group of vessels including at least one battleship.  Among
the B-17's making contact was "Typhoon McGoon."  "Typhoon McGoon" came
back to Espiritu Santo Island with tall surfaces entirely shot away. It
had fought off seven Japanese aircraft, shooting down 3 of and
perhaps two more.  First Marine Air Wing (MAW-1) at Guadalcanal heard
"Typhoon McGoon's" report and the dive and torpedo planes were readied.

The convoy, carrying a force which General Vandegrift put at 30,000 to
35,000 troops, had been sighted and hit during the morning by SBD's from
USS Enterprise (CV-6).  At 1018 hours, sixteen B-17's were ordered to
attack from Espiritu Santo Island.  While the B-17s were making their
way northward, Marine and Navy planes from Henderson Field carried out
two damaging strikes on the Japanese armada.  The B-17's arrived in two
flights, the first securing one hit on a transport from 17,000 feet
(5,182 m); the second straddling a seaplane tender from 20,000 feet
(6,096 m).  Of fifteen land-based Zekes intercepting, at least five were
shot down.  The bombers suffered only minor damage.  Throughout the day
the destruction of the transports, now separated from their escort,
continued.  The 67th Fighter Squadron, able to put only four planes in
the air, helped provide high cover for the TBF's and SBD's.  By
nightfall, eight of the twelve vessels were either sunk or gutted.

In the early morning hours of Sunday, 15 Nov, the U.S. Navy task force,
commanded by Rear Admiral  Willis A. Lee, sailed past Savo Island with
the battleships USS South Dakota (BB-57) and USS Washington (BB-56) and
slugged the Japanese hard.  The enemy had come down with a force
including two battleships and six cruisers he left for safer waters
minus HIJMS Kirishima, the Hiyei's sister ship.  Two cruisers, one heavy
and one light, may also have been sunk.

With daylight of 15 Nov, one of the 67th Fighter Squadron's P-39's was
out looking for breakfast fires, new tracks through the jungle, any sign
of enemy activity.  It was no routine patrol.  Along the shore at
Tassafaronga, Guadalcanal, about 18 miles (29 km) west of Lunga Point,
the pilot saw a beached vessel; two more were in process of beaching and
another was heading for shore.  Here were the survivors of the 12-ship
convoy which had been worked over the afternoon before.  To make sure,
the pilot flew over at 800 feet (244 m) with the AAA literally bursting
under his nose, then back to Henderson Field with his discovery.

MOP-UP

Abetted by the Navy and Marine flyers, the 67th Fighter Squadron and
70th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) played havoc with the beached
vessels.  By 0700 hours the 67th Fighter Squadron had in commission five
planes which went out with the SBD's and the B-26's.  All five dived on
the last ship to reach the beach, scoring two direct hits, setting the
vessel afire.  The B-26's dropped a 1,000-pounder (454 kg) on the third
ship from 8,000 feet (2,438 m); two more 1,000-pounders burst among
small craft attempting to unload supplies.  At 0900 hours, the 67th
Fighter Squadron returned with seven aircraft, to put four bombs on the
only vessel not then burning.

When the Japanese vessels were reported off Tassafaronga, 14 B-17's
left Espiritu Santo Island to attack.  The first flight, arriving over
the beach to find the destroyer USS Meade (DD-602) shelling ships which
were already on fire, did not bomb.  The second flight continued on up
to the Russell Islands, made two hits on a burning transport-one of four
derelicts abandoned by the Japanese in that area.

The Marines meanwhile had been able to bring a 105 mm battery to bear on
one of the ships, in addition to the 600 rounds USS Meade had expended.
Marine or Navy aircraft attacked all day, and at 1045 hours four P-39's
made a hit on the least damaged of the blazing hulks.  On their return
the flight spotted the bow of a sinking warship.  Heads bobbed in the
water nearby, whether friendly or enemy the pilots did not know.
Returning to USS Meade, the flight strung out in line, flew across the
destroyer's bow, waggling wings-out to the survivors and back.  Three of
these circuits convinced the destroyer and she went to investigate.  The
bobbing heads were American.

The ruined vessels off Tassafaronga burned for four days, their twisted
hulks symbolic of the blasted Japanese hopes.  A phase of the Solomon
Islands campaign was at an end: Guadalcanal and Tulagi Islands were now
secure and the American forces could give some thought to an offensive.
The decision in Nov, unlike that of the previous month, had been
obtained in two short but intense naval actions.  The 67th Fighter
Squadron, chief victim of the only Japanese shelling during the critical
period, had been unable to strike heavy blows.  Nor, in the nature of
the case, could the B-17's based 640 miles (1,185 km) away at Espiritu
Santo Island.  Admirals Scott and Callaghan, killed in action, and
Admiral Lee deservedly garnered the greater part of the glory.

After their decisive beating in mid-Nov, the Japanese made no major
effort to recover Guadalcanal.  During Dec 42 and Jan 43 the Express
continued to run, putting small forces ashore and a rather large one on
14 Jan.  These increments, however, were in the nature of replacements.
Henceforth, the enemy was forced to content himself with a tenacious
defense; never again did he mount a sustained threat to Henderson Field.

For the Americans, the defensive period on Guadalcanal was over by
Dec 42.  The 1st Marine Division had borne the brunt of the Japanese
assaults on Henderson Field Field.  With the exception of the 8th and
2d Marine Regiments, it was withdrawn on 9 Dec to be replaced during
Dec and early Jan 43 by two Army divisions.  These were the Americal,
which began arriving in Nov, and the 25th Infantry Division.  These
units, plus the fresh 6th Marine Regiment and the 2d Battalion of the
10th Marine Regiment, now proceeded to the offensive on Guadalcanal.
On 9 Dec, Major General Alexander M. Patch, USA, succeeded General
Vandegrift, USMC, as island commander.

With more abundant fuel and supplies, air operations proceeded on a more
extensive scale.  The pattern remained the same.  The Marines still
directed air activity, but the USAAF was more heavily represented.  The
USAAF now was able to send up additional fighter units, its heavy
bombers moved forward to base on Guadalcanal, and all forces struck
regularly at the Express on its trips down The Slot.  Buin on
Bougainville Island was in easy range of the B-17's and the new Japanese
base at Munda Point, New Georgia Island received constant attention.

On 17 Dec a preliminary offensive to the west was initiated.  When the
25th Infantry Division, under Major General J. Lawton Collins was
brought into position, a determined drive up Guadalcanal's north coast
was undertaken.  The XIV Corps' push, opened on 10 Jan 43, proceeded
amid bitter fighting, and finally freed Henderson Field from the menace
of Pistol Pete.  On 9 Feb organized Japanese resistance was eliminated.
On 8 Jan, a search plane sighted 15 enemy destroyers heading up the
channel, the last run of the famous Express.  It had apparently
evacuated the remaining officers and active troops and left hundreds of
sick, wounded, and starving Japanese to be swept up by the Army.

USAAF units on Guadalcanal worked with the ground forces in much the
same manner as had the old 67th Fighter Squadron.  Better planes were
available: P-38's for escort, P-40's for the middle air, and P-39's for
escort and ground strafing.  If a particularly stubborn enemy
strongpoint were encountered, the B-17's might be called on to clear the
way.  The 67th Fighter Squadron had retired from Guadalcanal for a
well-deserved rest, but pilots of the 44th, 68th, 70th, and 339th
Fighter Squadrons took up the burden.

Most significant among these encouraging events was the activation of
the Thirteenth Air Force, occurring, appropriately enough, on 13 Jan 43.
Although operational control remained with COMSOPAC, USAAF units
henceforth were trained and administered by a theater air force, under
General Twining.  It was this air force, evolved from such pioneer units
as the 11th Bombardment Group (Heavy) and the 67th Fighter Squadron,
that was destined to move up through the Solomon Islands until it rested
on the Admiralty Islands beyond Rabaul, New Britain Island, then to
swing along the north coast of New Guinea, through successive forward
strides, anticipating the day when its mission reports would come in
headed-Tokyo.