Date: Thu, 1 Feb 1996 10:18:35 -0800 From: Bill Stone <bstone@SONIC.NET> Subject:
Vichy and Pearl Harbor

I tie together ongoing threads about Vichy honor (or lack thereof; I make no
judgment here) and Pearl Harbor (a conspiracy of high school Biology teachers?)
with some trepidation for fear of provoking a barrage of email suffcient to
overload servers from here to Vichy to Saigon to Tokyo to Honolulu and back
again.

With that warning out of the way, allow me to explain the connection between
Vichy's diplomatic actions and the Day of Infamy.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Japan complained to the French government about the
ongoing shipment of oil, trucks, and war materiel from the port of Haiphong in
French Indo-China by railroad to Kunming in China to help support Chiang
Kai-shek's regime. Since technically no state of war existed between Japan and
China, France refused to halt shipments. In the winter of 1939/1940, the Japanese
military showed its displeasure by bombing the rail line.

By June 1940, when the Wehrmacht's blitzkrieg overran France, approximately
10,000 tons of war goods, most from the US, were being shipped each month from
Haiphong into China, and a backlog of 125,000 tons had accumulated in the port.

As metropolitan France collapsed, on 19 June 1940 the Japanese government
presented the French ambassador in Tokyo with its demand to cease shipment of all
war materiel to China and to accept a Japanese control commission in Indo-China
to regulate the agreement. Simultaneously, Japanese troops demonstrated on the
Chinese border with Indo-China and IJN warships sailed into the Gulf of Tonkin.
The French government was given 48 hours to rely to the demands. At the same
time, the British government received demands to close the Burma road supply
route into China.

General Catroux, Governor-General of Indo-China, acting on his own initiative due
to the confusion reigning in France, sought US support, but such support was not
forthcoming. Given the defeat of France, the impossibly weak military position of
the colony, and the inability to gain support from abroad, the Japanese demands
were met. Similarly, Britain closed the Burma road. General Catroux, who had
acted strenuously to resist Japanese pressure, was dismissed. (He rallied to the
Free French and later became High Commissioner to the Middle East and then
Governor-General of Algeria.)

On 1 August 1940 the Japanese government presented Vichy with further demands:
"...right of transit for Japanese forces through Indo-China; construction of
airfields in the colony; and agreement in principle to an economic arrangement
which would bind Indo-China securely to the Japanese sphere." Again Vichy turned
to the US for support; again it was not forthcoming. Nevertheless, General
Weygand, Vichy Minister of Defense, initially favored military resistance, but
the Cabinet eventually concluded that resistance would be doomed to failure and
Indo-China would be permanently lost. On 29 August a preliminary political
agreement recognizing Japanese interests in the area was signed. Next day the
Japanese Army presented additional military demands which amounted to virtual
occupation.

At this point Japanse forces in China threatened to advance across the border.
Chiang Kai-shek in turn threatened to attack French Indo-China if it became a
Japanese base. At the same time, Siam pressed its claims for Indo-Chinese
territory.

Both Britain and the US notified Tokyo of their opposition to military
occupation, but neither power was prepared to defend the colony or to send
aircraft and other weapons.

The final agreement, signed 22 September 1940, "...made available for the
Japanese three airfields in Tonkin (as against six originally called for);
granted permission for the stationing of 6000 Japanese troops (as against 25,000
or 32,000 first demanded); agreed to permit eventual passage of Japanese forces
(never to exceed more than 25,000 men) through Tonkin to Yunnan..." and, subject
to further negotiation, allowed a Japanese division to evacuate China via Tonkin.
Although these concessions were not insignificant, they did not include the
critical facilities of southern Indo-China.

Before negotiation on the final point commenced, the Japanese division in
question crossed the border. The Vichy army resisted but could not stop the
Japanese advance. Eventually frantic diplomatic efforts halted the movement
pending final negotiation.

Despite this show of arms, the US continued to rule against selling aircraft,
weapons, or supplies for Indo-China.In December 1940 and January 1941 Siam and
Vichy Indo-Chinese forces fought a brief war over their border along the Mekong.
Siam gained the upper hand on the ground, but "its fleet was destroyed" (three
ships were sunk) by the Vichy squadron. Japan, unwilling to tolerate such
disturbances -- even those partly Japanese inspired -- in such a sensitive area,
mediated a settlement which, by no coincidence, strengthened its own position in
southeast Asia.

Again, Vichy military resistance had proved futile.

The final act was played out in the summer of 1941.

On 12 July of that year, the Japanese ambassador in Vichy presented the latest
demands: "permission to dispatch the 'necessary' land, sea, and air forces to
southern Indo-China; occupation of eight air and two naval bases in the same
region; recognition of freedom of movement for Japanese forces in southern
Indo-China; withdrawal of French garrisons from the places to be occupied by the
Japanese."

Although the US strongly advised Vichy not to acquiesce, for the third time there
was no hope of military support. Neither Britain (which had just seized the Vichy
Levant by force of arms) nor the US was willing even to send warships to
Indo-Chinese waters.

(It was around this time that Admiral Darlan told the US ambassador, Admiral
Leahy, in regard to American advice and assistance: "If and when the United
States can bring to Marseilles three thousand tanks, five hundred thousand men
and six thousand planes, be sure to let me know, for then you will be welcomed.")

On 21 July the preliminary agreement was, inevitably, signed. On the 23rd local
arrangements were settled in Hanoi. On 29 July 1941 the final protocols were
exchanged. In its one concession, Japan agreed that Vichy retained sovereignty
over the colony.

In addition to eight airfields in southern Indo-China (notably those around
Saigon which put Singapore within range of Japanese land-based warplanes), Japan
took possession of naval facilities at Camranh Bay and Saigon. Troops were
already arriving in Saigon on 28 July, and some 50,000 men were soon dispatched.

Without those air and naval bases, Japanese military operations aimed at Malaya,
Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies would have proved extremely difficult.
The gaining of them, though, ensured the need of them.

On 26 July 1941, recognizing the critical nature of Japan's diplomatic victory in
Indo-China but perhaps not realizing that at this point possession of the new
bases would make feasible military ventures which previously had been only
theory, President Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing all Japanese funds
and assets in the United States. The same day all British and Dominion trade
treaties with Japan were terminated, as, two days later, was the Dutch-Japanese
agreement. These actions brought Japanese international trade almost to a
standstill, an impossible position for an industrialized nation completely
dependent on imported raw materials. In particular, Japan produced only 10% of
its petroleum requirements, and foreign sources were suddenly dry.

Under these circumstances the Japanese government concluded that, before
stockpiles of strategic materials were consumed, it must finally reach a suitable
accord with the US, or initiate war. In this case Japanese diplomacy failed, and
on 8 December 1941 (7 December in the United States), Japanese forces from bases
in southern Indo-China invaded Siam and Malaya, and eventually overran Singapore,
Burma, British Borneo, Sumatra, and Java. Meanwhile, to protect its exposed
flank, Japanese carrier-based aircraft proceeded to methodically demolish the
American Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor.

Sources -------

Langer, William L. and S. Everett Gleason. THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION, 1937-1940.
New York: Harper Brothers, 1952.

Langer, William L. and S. Everett Gleason. THE UNDECLARED WAR, 1940-1941. New
York: Harper Brothers, 1953.

Kirby, Major-General S. Woodburn, et al. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, volume 1. London:
HMSO, 1957.

de Gaulle, Charles. THE COMPLETE WAR MEMOIRS OF CHARLES DE GAULLE, 1940-1946. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1964.

Tansill, Charles Callan. BACK DOOR TO WAR: THE ROOSEVELT FOREIGN POLICY,
1933-1941. Chicago: Regnery, 1952.

---------------------------- Bill Stone Santa Rosa, CA bstone@sonic.net

World War II Web Site: http://www.sonic.net/~bstone