A.J.P. Taylor and the Anschluss

1933 - Hitler is made Chancellor.

7 March 1936 - Hitler begins the Anschluss, or the expansion of Germany to its pre-WWI boundaries, when he reoccupies the Rhineland.

May - 1937 Neville Chamberlain becomes Prime Minister of England.

• Is Driven towards the general pacification of Europe by his"programme".
• Neville is of the opinion that Germans were the victims of national injustice: 6 million Germans in Austria were forbidden by peace treaties of 1919 to national reunification; 3 million Germans in Czechoslovakia remained unconsulted as to thier choise of national identification; and 350,000 German people resided in Danzig.
• Chamberlain was discredited when the "crash" came in 1940.

• Hitler encouraged German agitation in Czechoslovakia. Discouraged it in Austria because he did not want to begin there.

Hitler discusses three cases within the Hossbach memorandum made at the Chancellery:

• Case 1 was "period 1943-1945".

• Case 2 involved civil war in France.

• Case 3 concerned war between France and Italy. If this were to occur by 1938 the objective would become to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously.

• At issue was Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia.
• England wanted to see alterations made by peaceful evolution.

1938 - Hitler begins the Anschluss

Jan. - Austrian police raid Nazi headquarters.

• Schuschnigg (herein Sch.) believed Austrian-Nazis would be condemned by Mussolini, the Western Powers, and even further by Hitler if decisive evidence was found against them.
• Detailed plans for an armed rising are discovered. These plans are said to have been outlined regardless of Hitler's orders.
• Sch. - hence claims the Nazis were acting short of the proper authority.
• Sch. took his evidence to Papen. Papen, German ambassador, wealthy and aristocratic, and a conservative among the Roman Catholic Church would surely be upset by evidence of Nazi intrigue.
• Papen, in resentment of the efforts made on behalf of the Nazi underground in Austria suggested Sch. to direct his complaints over to Hitler.
• Papen either saw that Sch. would be driven to make further concessions to the German national cause in Austria or he was in the hopes that Hitler would rebuke the Nazi extremists. In this Papen would discredit his unruly rivals and in the other case he would gain merit by advancing the German cause.
• Papen wanted to achieve peaceful success in Austria similar to the way he brought Hitler to power in Germany.

12 Feb. - The Austrian affair was under weigh.

• Hitler tells the attendant generals to keep up "military pressure shamming action " until 15 Feb.

• Grandi and Chamberlain both welcomed this opening.
• Eden was antagonistic. He was already outraged that Chamberlain turned down a proposal made by FDR for an international conference to discuss each matter of grievance.
• Eden imagined this conference might draw the U.S. on to the side of the Western Powers.
• Chamberlain feared that it would be a replica of the Brussels conference over the Far East - that "the U.S. would propound moral principles" and England and France would be in line to provide the force necessary to sustain them.
• Eden insisted that there be no new discussions until the Italians lived up to their promise of withdrawing "volunteers" from Spain.
• Chamsberlain was willing to tolerate a Fascist victory in Spain if he could win over the Italians for moderating Hitler.

• Chamberlain won Grandi's approval and support on the matter.

• Halifax becomes foreign secretary in order for Chamberlain's policy to be carried out.
• The Italian price was paid and negotiations would soon begin.

• Arrangements to settle Italian terms were agreed on: namely their empire in Abyssinia would be recognized and the promise of equal partnership in the Mediterranean was stated.
• Austria remained a displaced issue.
• Grandi believed the British attitude there would insist on being one of "indignant resignation".
• Chamberlain held no intentions concerning Austrian affairs. He planned on the fact that Anglo-Italian negotiations would deter Hitler and perhaps instigate Mussolini to resistance.
• The Italians kept Hitler informed on the conversations and further assured him that issues in reference to Austria would not be discussed. Italy could not afford to impair German-Italian relations.

• At issue was the dismissal of the conservative ministers.
• The resignation of Schacht is finally revealed.

• Leopold's activities were declared "insane" and he and his principal associates would soon be expelled from Austria.
• A few days later Hitler gave them another rating, insisting that " the evolutionary course be taken whether or not the possibility of success could today be foreseen."
• The Protocol signed by Sch. made claims so far-reaching that if it was completely carried out the Austrian problem might automatically be solved.

• Sch. avoided the warning.

9 March - Sch. announces the method of a plebiscite to the world.

• Sch's only plan for the plebiscite was merely to rush it by Hitler before he could produce any reaction to it. However it was to be carried out, this act was an open defiance of Hitler.
• German nationalism and Independent Austria engaged in the first moment of conflict.
• The German army stood unprepared for a campaign of this nature.
• Orders were issued for forces in close proximity to Austria to prepare to cross the frontier on March 12th.

• Sch. found that the Powers who had earlier protected Austrian independence to be adamant about the plebiscite method.
• Sch. was abandoned and he agreed to postpone the plebiscite order.
• In response, Goering told Seyss-Inquart that the Germans felt little confidence in Sch. that he must resign and that Seyss-Inquart must take his position.
• Sch. duly resigned.
• Miklas, the President refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart in a gesture of Austrian independence.
• Goering stated that German troops would stop at the frontier if Seyss-Inquart was made Chancellor by 7:30 p.m.
• Miklas held out.
• Seyss-Inquart had to appoint himself Chancellor at 8:00 p.m.
• Seyss-Inquart was ordered to seek German help to restore law and order. He did so by a telegram sent at 9:10 p.m.
• Hitler moved forward regardless of an appeal: the order to invade Austria was issued at 8:45 p.m.
• The Germans feared Czechoslovakia would intervene although Goering told the Czech minister that Czechoslovakia had no reason to be threatened.
• Goering assured Neville Henderson that the troops would be withdrawn when the situation was stabilized and that free elections would be restored without compromise.
• Mussolini would not even answer the telephone. "Austria did not interest him at all."
• In London, Halifax told Ribbentrop that the plebiscite represented a threat of force and was thereby an "intolerable method".
• Chamberlain wanted to achieve German-British understanding as soon as everyone "got past this unpleasant affair".
• In Berlin, Henderson and Goering agreed that "Dr. Schuschnigg had acted with plebiscite folly".
• The British government only gave Vienna that they could not take responsibility for giving advice that could possibly land Austria in trouble.
• The French government at present only in half-existence, decided to take "military measures - meaning the recall of some reservists" contingent upon British approval.
• No approval came from London; none of the French reservists were recalled.

• Hitler entered Austria on the morning of the 12th.
• At Linz, Hitler addressed the crowds.
• On the balcony of Linz Town Hall he made a decision: he would not establish a tame government in Vienna, instead he would incorporate Austria in the Reich.
• Seyss-Inquart was told to issue a law ordering Austria along with himself out of existence.

• Seyss-Inquart follows his orders.
• The Anschluss was presented for approval to the people of Greater Germany.

• Gamelin had this to say "the French could "tie down" some German troops; they would be unable to beat through the Siegfried Line (not an effective defenseive position at this time); the ofly effective way of attacking Germany would prove to be through Belgium, and British Diplomatic support was essential to this strategy.

• The Soviet government called for need of discussion "in the League of Nations or outside of it for the collective saving of peace".
• Halifax saw no monumental value in a conference "designed less to secure the settlement of outstanding problems than to organize concerted action against aggression".

• The British provide an answer in reference to discussions between the French Ambassador and Halifax over the question of Austria. In a memorandum made for the French government the British emphasized their commitments under Locarno. "those commitments are in thier view no mean contribution to the maintainance of peace in Europe, and, though they have no intention of withdrawing from them, they cannot see thier way to add to them"
• There was "little hope" that military operations set by France and the Soviet Union could entirely prevent the occupation of Czech by Germany.
• The British at best could only offer their support by the "economic pressure" of blockade.

• The Austrian round was over and Czechoslovakia would soon move up on the agenda.
• Hitler realized the threat Czech posed as allies with France and Soviet Russia.
• A direct attack on Czech. would likely raise French intrigue on Germany. hitler would have to rely on the increase in conflict between France and Italy in order to deter French interest away from Czech. (Case 3)

• Hitler recieves the Sudeten representatvies
• Hitler appoints Henlein as the leader of the Sudeten representatives. Henlein becomes the "Viceroy" of the area.
• The Sudeten representatives were told to negotiate with the Czech government.
• In Henlein's words "we must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied"
• President Benes of Czechoslovakia hoped the French and the British would stand on his side.
• Benes, a defender of democracy, relied heavily on treaties and international rights.
• Benes was ready to negotiate with the Sudetans and they with him. Neither could negotiate from an advantage. British and French opinion was at the crux of the decision making between the two parties.
• Other Czech minority groups would also have an impact on the outcome of the negotiations.
• Benes requested an open demand for dissolution in the hopes that the Western Powers would back him
• Benes' limitations - Czechoslovakia's alliances were strong only on paper
• The alliance of mutual defense with France (1925) and the alliance with Soviet Russia (1935) were only enforcible if France acted first. The Little Entente with Rumania and Yugoslavia was directed against Hungary.
• Benes, in hindsight, neglected the alliance with the Soviets. He previously won the independance of Czechoslovakia with Western aid, not with Soviet assistance. Furthermore, the Spanish Civil War warned against defending democracy with Soviet assistance.
• The Czech Agrarians (the largest party in the govt. coalition) despised any partnership with the communists.
• Benes, a pacifist, recognized the Czechs had taken close to 300 years to recover from the disaster of the White Mountain in 1620. He did not want the people to suffer another great tragedy.
• The Czech army had 34 divisions and was easily a match for the poorly trained German army of 1938.
• The British and French wished to avoid a decision between war and humiliation.
• The French had a specific obligation of alliance with the Czechs.
• The British were only committed as members of the rotting League of Nations. They thought that there was a solution to the Sudeten German problem and that negotiations could produce it.

The newly formed government of Leon Blum is overthrown. Daladier and Bonnett were expected to lead France into WWII. Daladier survived as prime minister until April 1940. Bonnett as foreign minister until Sept. 1939. Daladi July 1945 - The Anschluss comes to a halt when the representatives of the powers meet at Postdam.

surrender of Germany