During the first half of the twentieth century, when historians all but ignored the military history of the Revolution, as well as later American wars, military history belonged to the professional soldiers. No officer achieved the influence of Emory Upton, whose The Military Policy of the United States since 1775 (1904) blamed most American wartime mistakes on an undue reliance upon citizen-soldiers, especially the militia, and a consequent failure to maintain a substantial professional army. Since what Upton and his fellow soldier-historians saw as a failed military policy had begun in the Revolution, the Continental Congress received harsh criticism for failing to raise a huge regular army and for relying heavily upon the militia, an institution pictured almost wholly in negative terms. Certainly the evidence existed for a portrait of disorganized, unruly farmers who fled at the first shot, and the Uptonians' books abound in negative quotations from Washington and his lieutenants.

The post-World War II years have seen academic historians take military history more seriously. The most sophisticated of them, from senior scholars such as Russell Weigley and John Shy to junior scholars such as Fred Anderson and Harold Selesky, have done so in the context of American society. Although the part-time soldiers deserved some slings and arrows, these scholars show that the much-maligned irregulars had their important moments. Thanks to the colonial militias and the provincial congresses that took control of them in 1774-1775, the revolutionists began their struggle with Britain in control of the infrastructures of every colony-state. That turned out to be a formidable advantage that few if any revolutionary movements in modern history have possessed. That also became the principal disadvantage the loyalists faced from the beginning to the end of the eight-and-a-half year struggle. Throughout the conflict militia enforced state laws and served as local constabularies. For example, the Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge near [End Page 553] Wilmington, North Carolina, in the late winter of 1776 resulted in a catastrophic defeat for the king's friends from which they never recovered. The militia not only engaged in guerrilla or partisan warfare against loyalist units but also at times against British armies. This fighting was the kind they knew best. They also proved exceedingly valuable in the winter months as Continental armies contracted owing to expiring enlistments, deaths, and desertion. The part-time soldiers helped man the lines during the winter encampments as Washington and other generals recruited men to appear in the spring and swell the numbers of their military commands.

Mark V. Kwasny, in Washington's Partisan War, 1775-1783, contends that the militia's role in some military theaters is better appreciated than in others. He is on target about upper New York, especially the Saratoga campaign of 1777. At Bennington, Freeman's Farm, and Bemis Heights their sharpshooting and harassing tactics helped spell defeat for General John Burgoyne. The author also correctly points to the well-documented bushwhacking accomplishments of Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and Andrew Pickens in the South. And the success of Generals Daniel Morgan and Nathanael Greene in blending militiamen and Continentals in the Carolinas has received substantial coverage in monographs and in The Papers of Nathanael Greene. Kwasny maintains that the role of the militia in parts of Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey has been neglected and misunderstood. His focus is on the area, broadly defined, extending around the land side of New York City and into the three above-mentioned states. This was the region occupied by Washington's army from 1776 to 1783. The author seeks to make at least two major points. First, Washington's view of militia "is perhaps the most misun-derstood aspect of his generalship" (p. xiv). He felt it imperative to use the state forces for temporary or short-term duty, and he recognized they could perform effectively in irregular operations. Second, the war in the Middle States amounted to much more than simply a traditional European-style conflict, even though Washington did raise an army that closely resembled its British counterpart. Citing statistics from Howard H. Peckham's The Toll Of Independence, Kwasny notes that militia took part on its own in 191 clashes in these three northern states compared to 194 contests in the Carolinas and Georgia. As for combined militia-Continental engagements, there were 485 in the former states and 260 in the latter ones, surely evidence that the partisan war in the North has lacked adequate coverage.

In addressing the theater in and around Washington's army, Kwasny takes us through the war, year by year, campaign by campaign. By the spring and summer of 1776, with General William Howe's evacuation of Boston, the Middle Colonies became the focus of the war for Britain until after France entered the struggle. Washington shifted his attention briefly to Pennsylvania [End Page 554] during parts of 1777-1778 as Howe, after taking New York, sent part of his army by sea against Philadelphia. Washington fought two unsuccessful battles against his rival in the fall of 1777, at Brandywine and Germantown, before settling in for the winter at Valley Forge. When Howe's successor, Sir Henry Clinton, evacuated Philadelphia in June 1778 and returned overland through New Jersey to New York City, the war in the North then centered around Manhattan, Staten Island, and Long Island. Throughout this time the Continental army bore the brunt of the conflict as it dueled Howe and Clinton in rather traditional setpiece encounters. At times, however, the militia proved valuable in reconnaissance, foraging, maintaining internal order, and supporting Washington in countless other ways.

Washington had learned during this first three-year phase of the war several important things about state troops. They did not fight well in large numbers combined with regulars, and they lacked the discipline and training to be effective in stand-up battles. He also learned, and here Kwasny makes a major point, that the often-criticized state governments at times made impressive efforts to put men in the field. Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey earned high marks and so did their respective governors: Jonathan Trumbull, George Clinton, and William Livingston, all exceptionally able men who served throughout almost the entire length of the war as chief executives. Washington and Congress deferred to these state leaders because they had no legal control over the state militias; but owing to the commander in chief's tact and persuasive skills of communication, the states at times delegated considerable authority to him for directing their forces.

Fortunately for Washington, his experiences with these states, their governors, and their militia served him well for the remainder of the war, a time when there were no major engagements in the North and the militia and their partisan tactics played an even larger role than had been true earlier. In the stages when he contended in the field with a major British army, Washington had been reluctant to dilute the Continental army by sending it to assist the state militias in protecting locales and sections vulnerable to enemy raids. After 1778 he could be more flexible in this respect, be it the Connecticut coastline, the lower Hudson Valley, or the New Jersey towns across from Staten Island.

This solid, workmanlike monograph, based on impressive research and laced with first-rate maps, contains few startling surprises, but it gives the reader a greater appreciation of the performance of the states and their leaders in the northern theater of the war. And it shows that Washington was flexible in his use of the militia, which at times surprised him with its turnout and its performance. Kwasny does not address the long-run consequences of the militia's part in [End Page 555] the Revolution; that was not his purpose. But implicit here are reasons why Washington and other nationalist leaders recognized that militia reform was imperative for the nation. There were all too many instances of militia turning out in far fewer numbers than called, appearing with inadequate weapons or none at all, and leaving before their service had expired. Militia could usually be counted on to appear in defense of their own states, particularly if they received specific and limited assignments. But beyond these probabilities there lay question marks about their reliability, despite the strenuous efforts of such able militia commanders as Generals Gold S. Silliman of Connecticut, Philemon Dickenson of New Jersey, and James Clinton of New York. In all likelihood, without a massive militia reinforcement that Washington knew to be a doubtful achievement, he had no chance of achieving his greatest goal prior to Yorktown: the liberation of New York City, a dicey proposition even with French support.

Militia reform constituted a significant aspect of the nationalists' program for greater federal consolidation in the Confederation era. But Washington's 1783 blueprint for militia control, his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," failed in Congress, as did Secretary at War Henry Knox's similar document in 1786. Ironically, it took Shays's Rebellion, which involved not a foreign danger but the Massachusetts militia's inability to maintain internal order, to give a boost to the concept of a federalized militia. Now reformers wanted, besides better training and a measure of congressional oversight, authority for Congress to use the militia against the states or any of their citizens in certain cases involving internal disturbances and breaches of federal law. Of course, the inclusion of such provisions in the Constitution of 1787 prompted Antifederalists to extract from James Madison a bill of rights, which included the Second Amendment. But the Second Amendment, contrary to NRA contentions, is silent on gun ownership rights; rather it guarantees the states the right to control their militias when not actually in federal service.