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Fish was not renominated for governor, but was supported by the Seward-Weed Whigs for the United States Senate in 1851. A deadlock in the legislature lasting over two months, caused by one Whig senator's dissatisfaction with his refusal to commit himself to the compromise measures of 1850, was only broken in his favor by a vote taken in the absence of two Democrats. In the Senate he achieved no special distinction. He followed his senior colleague, Seward, and his friend, Sumner, in their opposition to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, though he was not disposed to make slavery a dominant issue in politics. Regretting the demise of the Whig party, he finally joined the Republican as the one according most nearly with his principles, but did not enter very energetically into its earlier activities. After the expiration of his term as senator he took his family to Europe for a stay of two years. By the time he returned his convictions had crystallized sufficiently to warrant him in working for Lincoln's election and in advising the outgoing administration to adopt a firm policy toward South Carolina and the seceding states. He was concerned in the outfitting of the Star of the West for supplying Fort Sumter, and expressed to Gen. Scott the opinion that the firing on the ship meant war. During the Civil War he served on the Union defense committee of his state and as a commissioner of the federal government for the relief of prisoners, contributing to the ultimate negotiation of the exchange agreement.
He had no special political or personal claim to a place in Grant's cabinet, although their acquaintanceship had extended to his entertainment of the General in his home. He had no desire for office and was unresponsive to suggestions of a ministerial post. When, after encountering several difficulties in early appointments, the President offered him the post of secretary of state, he promptly declined by telegraph, but followed his refusal by a reluctant acceptance through a personal mission of Gen. Babcock (New York Tribune, Jan. 25, 1879). He was commissioned Mar. 11, 1869. Intending to serve only until the administration had become stabilized, he remained in office through both of Grant's terms, despite repeated offers of resignation. He became a pillar of the administration and an influence for moderation in all its policies. In his own department he was an efficient executive, introducing reforms in the organization of personnel and classification of records. He brought to bear upon his duties a calm and orderly legal mind, a generally cautious temperament, and a fund of patience in working toward his ends against discouraging odds.
Fish's conduct of foreign relations in general was greatly affected by the question of annexation of the revolution-torn Dominican Republic. He sanctioned a mission of Gen. Babcock thither which, from an inquiry concerning the acquisition of a naval base at Samana Bay, developed into an irregular agreement with the government in power for annexation. Grant strongly favored the project, and Fish, though doubtful, authorized the negotiation of a formal treaty, concluded Nov. 29, 1869, which failed of ratification by the Senate. Grant's attempt, in 1871, to put the measure through by joint resolution was likewise defeated, despite the removal of Senator Sumner, its powerful opponent, from his position as chairman of the foreign relations committee. The President's need of Fish's support in these efforts and his antipathy toward Sumner, which arose out of their failure, favored the success of the Secretary's policies in other fields, albeit the breach of Fish's friendship with Sumner, which he attempted vainly to avert, was a painful experience.
The most notable achievement of Fish's administration of his office was the settlement of the controversy with Great Britain over damages suffered by Northern commerce during the Civil War through the British government's conduct as a neutral. The central factor in this controversy was the havoc wrought by Confederate cruisers equipped or supplied in British ports; and, commemorating the most famous of these, the American demands became, as stated in the final treaty, "generically known as the 'Alabama claims.'" But behind these lay a mass of obscure grievances which in some minds extended to holding England's recognition of Confederate belligerency responsible for doubling the length of the war, with resulting liabilities which transcended monetary compensations and could only be extinguished by such a gesture as the cession of Canada. This view of the case was put, in part by implication, by Senator Sumner in the debate which led to rejection, in April 1869, of a convention concluded by the previous administration. Since the President inclined to the same view, Sumner's speech set the tone of Fish's official policy for nearly two years, as expressed in instructions to Motley, the minister in London, and conversations with Thornton, British minister at Washington (Senate Executive Document 11, 41 Cong., 3 Sess., pp. 2-5; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, III, 1873, 329-36; E. L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, 1893, IV, 409-10, 414; Adams, post, pp. 156-57, 160). Informally, however, he let it be understood that he was disposed to accept much less drastic terms, and a personal exchange of views to this effect was begun with Sir John Rose, a Canadian commissioner in the confidence of the British government, in July 1869 (J. C. B. Davis, Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, 1893, pp. 45-46). Not until November 1870, when Sumner's influence was waning through his opposition to the President's Dominican policy, did Fish intimate to the British minister the possibility of a settlement not including territorial compensation (Adams, post, p. 162). In January 1871 an understanding was reached through Rose for a joint high commission to arrange a settlement of the Alabama claims in connection with various questions regarding Canada at issue between the two governments--boundaries, fishing rights, navigation, and trade (J. B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States Has Been a Party, I, 1898, 523-31). Sumner's now categorically expressed opinion, that a definitive settlement could be based only on "the withdrawal of the British flag ... from this hemisphere," was brushed aside. His removal from his committee chairmanship took place before the resulting agreement reached the Senate for ratification, but he did not then oppose it.
The commissioners began their work in March and on May 8, 1871, signed the Treaty of Washington, providing for arbitration of the Alabama claims under a set of definitions of neutral duties which held a neutral power bound to "use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping" of belligerent cruisers in its ports. The arbitration conducted at Geneva encountered difficulties owing to the fact that, since the British government refused to admit in advance its neglect of these duties and its consequent liability, the American government refused to limit its claims, but put forward a number of indirect ones in addition to the damage directly inflicted by the Confederate cruisers. These were at last eliminated, in accordance with Fish's design, by the tribunal which, on Sept. 14, 1872, rendered a decision on the direct claims against Great Britain, fixing the amount of damages at $15,500,000. A most disturbing controversy was thus honorably settled. Some of the Canadian questions dealt with in the treaty, such as fishing rights and arrangements regarding trade, dragged on; but the water boundary in the Strait of San Juan de Fuca was adjusted in favor of the United States by an arbitral decision of the German Emperor in October 1872.
A stubborn insurrection in Cuba gave rise to a set of problems which embarrassed Fish throughout his eight years in office, obliging him to press on the Spanish government the claims of Americans for reparation of injuries at the hands of local authorities and to respond to its complaints regarding filibustering activities in the United States. Efforts to persuade Spain to an accommodation with the rebels accompanied his exertions to defeat advocates of recognition of them as belligerents and of intervention in their favor. Fish was personally opposed to such recognition, but he had to keep the possibility of its expediency in mind. The President was disposed to favor recognition of belligerency. On Aug. 19, 1869, during an absence from Washington and while Fish was in the midst of an earnest though futile correspondence with Spain over a plan of pacification based on Cuban independence and the abolition of slavery, he signed a proclamation of neutrality. Fish deferred promulgating this document and later received Grant's acknowledgment that it had been a mistake (Adams, post, p. 19). Largely because of Grant's need of his support in the policy of Dominican annexation, Fish persuaded the President to reverse his attitude and declare recognition of belligerency unjustified in his annual message of Dec. 6. The same situation helped him to secure a still stronger special message on June 13, 1870, when the advocates of recognition attempted, unsuccessfully, to push through a joint resolution of Congress in its favor. Meanwhile the American government's efforts with Spain were met with fair promises of reforms and redress of grievances, of which the fulfilment continually fell short. The tension was somewhat relieved, however, by an agreement, reached Feb. 11, 1871, for a joint commission at Washington to decide on American claims for damages.
The situation in Cuba, which remained unimproved, continued to present fresh difficulties, and Fish's instructions to Sickles, the minister at Madrid, had been displaying for a year a rising impatience with the Spanish government, when, in November 1873, a crisis arose which threatened to bring on hostilities. The steamer Virginius, under American registry and with a mainly American crew, but belonging to the Cuban revolutionary committee in New York and employed in its filibustering enterprises, was captured and taken into a Cuban port, where the Spanish authorities summarily executed the captain and fifty-three of the crew and passengers. In an ultimatum to the Spanish government of Nov. 14, Fish demanded release of the ship and survivors, signal punishment of the culpable officials, and a salute to the American flag within twelve days under threat of a severance of diplomatic relations. Warlike feeling rose in both countries, and Sickles had actually asked for his passports, when, on Nov. 27, Fish reached an understanding with the Spanish minister at Washington to dispense with the salute if his government was able to prove the illegality of the ship's registry. This condition was easily met. The critical phase of the affair lasted only a fortnight, but the questions of indemnities and punishment of the responsible officials dragged on as additions to the already numerous causes of friction with Spain.
A fresh start toward a general settlement was made with the appointment of Caleb Cushing as minister to Spain in February 1874. By holding up recognition of the new government of Alfonso XII until the Virginius indemnity claims were met, an award was secured, Mar. 11, 1875 (Department of State, Instructions, Spain, XVII, 177; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875, vol. II). With this question disposed of, the way was opened for negotiations of a broader scope looking toward the independence or autonomy of Cuba. These were initiated by Fish's instruction to Cushing of Nov. 5, 1875, which was to be read to the minister of foreign affairs. It pointed out the necessity of bringing about the pacification of Cuba if relations between the United States and Spain were to continue "even on their present footing"; otherwise, "it may be the duty of other governments to intervene." Copies of the instruction were sent for communication to the British and the principal Continental governments, inviting them to express similar views to Spain. This diplomatic campaign was upset by the transmission to Cushing, on Nov. 15, of a Spanish note meeting by specific undertakings all the particular points raised in recent correspondence. Fish finally, in an instruction of Mar. 1, 1876, reduced his suggestions regarding Cuban administration to reforms in the direction of self-government and the effective abolition of slavery. The Spanish government parried these by noncommittal replies while pouring into Cuba reinforcements which practically extinguished the insurrection by the end of the year. With the satisfaction of American claims by awards of the joint commission and the elimination of various other causes of complaint, the discussions over Cuba ended.
In the course of Fish's long tenure of office, many other problems of foreign relations came before the United States. The government assumed the protection of the interests of North German subjects in France during the Franco-Prussian War and vainly offered its good offices for peace and its counsel for a moderate settlement. Fish and the minister at Paris, E. B. Washburne, successfully confronted Bismarck in asserting the right to pass sealed dispatches through the German lines during the siege of the city. Fish's advice contributed to the attainment of an understanding between the belligerents which prevented the extension of hostilities into the Far East. Concerning America's own relations with China, Fish upheld rigidly the special position of American citizens under early treaties, and he pursued a policy of cooperation with the European governments in affirming and extending foreign rights and prestige. An attempt by an armed expedition to extort a convention from Korea on the treatment of shipwrecked sailors was unsuccessful. American interests in the Pacific area were greatly promoted by a treaty of commercial reciprocity with Hawaii in 1875, which virtually incorporated those islands into the economic system of the United States.
Two attempts were made by Fish to secure agreements for the construction of an interoceanic canal. The first was with Colombia for use of the Panama route, but the treaty signed at Bogota on Jan. 26, 1870, was so amended by the Colombian Senate that the strategic value of the enterprise was destroyed and the United States failed to ratify. The second attempt was made in negotiations at Washington with a special envoy of Nicaragua, in February 1877, but no agreement could be reached as to the status of a proposed neutral zone. Among other questions which occupied Fish's attention, but which were marked by no definite developments, were almost incessant troubles on the Mexican border, handled generally with tactful regard for Mexican susceptibilities, and a controversy with Great Britain over the principles of extradition, in which Fish upheld the view that, in the absence of definite provisions to the contrary, embodied in a convention, the charge brought in court need not be identical with that on which surrender was obtained. One of the unpleasant incidents of his official business was the recall at his demand of the Russian minister Catacazy, in 1871, for interference in the Alabama claims negotiations and public abuse of the President.
After his retirement from office Fish did not again emerge from the private life of a gentleman of ample means and cultivated tastes. Not least, indeed, among his qualifications for the principal office he held was his eminently respectable personality, combining cordiality with dignity, which gave a tone of culture and refinement to an otherwise rather tawdry administration. He had married, on Dec. 15, 1836, Julia Kean, descendant of William Livingston, first governor of New Jersey. She created for him a charming home life, and her graciousness and tact as a hostess effectively adorned the generous hospitality which made their house the social center of Washington and contributed notably to the smooth conduct of official business. They had eight children, three of them sons. Nicholas, the eldest, was for some years in the diplomatic service, finally resigning the legation in Belgium to devote himself to banking. Hamilton was private secretary to his father as secretary of state, member and speaker of the New York Assembly, assistant treasurer of the United States at New York, and member of the Sixty-first Congress. Stuyvesant [q.v.] became a financier and railway executive. Like his father, Fish played a prominent part in non-political civic and social affairs. For long periods of years he served as trustee of Columbia College and as president-general of the Society of the Cincinnati. He was also a president of the Union League Club and of the New York Historical Society, besides taking an active part in other literary and philanthropic organizations and in the affairs of the Episcopal Church. He died September 6, 1893.
text by Joseph V. Fuller, Dictionary of American Biography