Battle Narrative

Original fleet disposition as they                                                                                  Positions of carrier task groups

approached Leyte Gulf, from Potter                                                                            during approach to Leyte Gulf,

Nimitz, pg 329                                                                                                               from Humble, Battleships and

                                                                                                                                      Battlecruisers, pg. 170

The Japanese operational plan was designed as a two-pronged attack by surface forces culminating in attacks on the allied invasion forces at Leyte Gulf.  The Southern prong of the attack would consist of two groups, the first of the groups commanded by Vice Admiral Nishimura, included the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro.  The Second Striking Force, of the Southern Force, was commanded by Vice Admiral Shima and was centered on the heavy cruisers Nachi and Ashigara.  The approaching spearhead of the southern force, Vice Admiral Nishimura's Force “C”, was sighted by aircraft from the Third Fleet carriers USS Enterprise and USS Franklin of Rear Admiral Davison's task group (TG) 38.4 at 0905 on 24 October in the Sulu Sea near Saiton Point, Negros.  The planes that sighted the advancing Force “C” closed in for attack at 0918 and scored several hits, but caused only minor damage to Fuso’s fantail, while destroyer Shigure’s No.1 turret was damaged.  Vice Admiral Shima's Second Striking Force was located by a V Army Air Force aircraft at 1155, near the Cagayan Islands.  Even after being sighted, reported, and lightly attacked in the morning hours of 24 October, both sections of the Southern Force advanced through the afternoon with no resistance.  Rear Admiral Davison’s fast carrier group that provided the initial sightings and reports were moving out of range, north to engage the Centre Force in the San Bernardino Strait.  If Vice Admirals Nishimura and Shima continued to advance, they would be met by Seventh Fleet's surface forces.  Vice Admiral Kinkaid and his staff correctly surmised that the Southern Force would attempt to reach Leyte Gulf through Surigao Strait.  At 1215 on 24 October, Vice Admiral Kinkaid alerted every ship under his command to prepare for a night engagement.  At 1443, an additional order was passed to Rear Admiral Oldendorf, commander of the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, to take up night patrol positions across the northern entrance to the Surigao Strait and prepare to meet enemy shipping.  When Rear Admiral Oldendorf had formed his battle plan he called Rear Admirals Weyler, commanding the Battle Line, and Berkey, commander of the Right Flank cruisers and destroyers, aboard his flagship USS Louisville for a conference.  The main deficiency noted by all three admirals was the shortage of suitable ammunition for surface engagements against armored targets.  The battleships were especially low in armor-piercing shells for their main batteries:

(Chart from Morison History of Navy Ops in WWII, p. 202)

The battleships had shore bombardment loads rather than armor-piercing loads which are more suitable for action with enemy ships, therefore less than 25% of their shells at the start of the Leyte Gulf operation were AP, the remainder being HC bombardment ammunition.  Nearly 60% of their total load of HC shells had already been expended in support of the ground operation.  It was decided that in order to conserve ammunition the heavy ships would withhold fire until targets were within 20,000 yards, and they would load the first five salvos with AP and shift from AP to HC shells if they were engaging targets lighter than a battleship.  In addition, there were no replacement torpedoes on hand for the destroyers, which were also down to about 20% of their allowance in 5-inch shells.

Motor Torpedo Boats

On the afternoon of 24 October all 45 Seventh Fleet torpedo-boats moved at high speed south, through Surigao Strait, into the Mindanao Sea, accompanied by tenders USS Wachapreague, USS Oyster Bay, and USS Willoughby. The harbor at Liloan on Panaon Island provided ideal cover for the southern patrols tender, while the northern patrols tenders lay in San Pedro Bay.  At dusk the boats were in position on their patrol-lines in 13 sections of three boats each.  LCDR R.A... Leeson, commanding the patrols, disposed his 39 available patrol craft as follows:

Section 1 and 2:  patrol the southernmost line from Agio Point, Bohol, to Camiguin Island.

Section 3:  western entrance to Sogod Bay and Limasawa Island.

Section 5 and 6:  eastern entrance of Sogod Bay and around the southern end of Panoan Island.

Section 4, 7, and 8:  opposite numbers of section 11 patrolled cross strait about 3NM north of section 9.

Section 10:  Dinagat north shore and south of Kanihaan Island.

Section 12 and 13:  patrolled opposite section 10 around Amagusan Point, Leyte.

Rear Admiral Oldendorf was highly dependent on the motor-torpedo boats laying at the mouth of the strait for any advance warning of the Japanese approach.  The carrier USS Independence and her night capable aircraft had moved north, out of range, with Admiral Halsey.  Vice Admiral Nishimura, advancing towards Surigao Strait,  received Admiral Kurita's signal that the latter's powerful Centre Force had been delayed by heavy air attacks in the Sibuyan Sea, which meant Vice Admiral Nishimura could not hope to be supported by Admiral Kurita in his attack on Leyte Gulf.  Vice Admiral Nishimura group maintained course and speed.  As he approached Surigao Strait, Vice Admiral Nishimura sent Mogami and 3 destroyers ahead for reconnaissance.  The Mogami group went undetected and the PT boats' first contact was with the battleships.  At 2236, PT-131 of Section One, off the island of Bohol detected Vice Admiral Nishimura's larger ships on radar, and all three boats of Section One closed to attack.  At 2250 they made visual contact at a range of three miles,  and within two minutes were sighted by Shigure.  At 2254, Vice Admiral Nishimura ordered an emergency turn starboard towards the boats and at 2256 the Japanese ships turned on their searchlights and opened fire.  The boats attempted to close in for a torpedo attack but were driven off by Japanese gunfire,  two of them taking hits and damage.  PT-130 of Section One closed the nearby Section Two PT-127 and relayed a contact report through USS Wachapreague at 1210.  This contact report reached Rear Admiral Oldendorf at 0026 on October 26 and was the first confirmed information of the enemy's position received by the Admiral since 1000 the previous morning.  The heavy cruiser Mogami and her 3 accompanying destroyers got past Sections One and Two undetected.  At 2230 Vice Admiral Nishimura radioed Admirals Kurita and Shima that he was "advancing as scheduled while destroying enemy torpedo boats.".  As Vice Admiral Nishimura proceeded up Surigao Strait, each section of PT boats in succession attacked with torpedoes, each was detected by the Japanese searchlights and driven off by gunfire, retiring under cover of a smoke screen. At about 0400 Nishimura's heavy ships joined up again with the Mogami group, and at about 0100 Force "C" assumed its formation for the approach through the narrowest portion of Surigao Strait and the access to Leyte Gulf.  In the lead were two destroyers; Mishishio and Asagumo.  Four kilometers behind them were Yamashiro, with Shigure and Yamagumo on either flank, followed at one kilometer intervals by Fuso and Mogami.  Two more boat sections attacked the formation without making any hits. One of the torpedo-boats, PT-493, was damaged by gunfire and driven ashore on Panaon Island.  Later, at high tide,  PT-493 drifted off the rocks and sank.  At 0213 on October 25th, the last action between the motor-torpedo boats and Force "C" ended.

Destroyer Squadron Fifty-four

CDS54 attacks, from Morison

History of Naval Ops in WWII, pg 214

At 0006 on October 25, Captain J. Coward awaited positional information on the approaching Force "C".  Commanding his group of destroyers patrolling on the line Hingatungan Point to Hibuson to Desolation Point to Homonhon Island, Captain Coward was concerned as his squadron was down to approximately 45% of their average fuel capacities.  At 0026, the first contact report on Vice Admiral Nishimura reached Rear Admiral Oldendorf and at 0038 the second contact report on Vice Admiral Shima's advancing force confirmed that two columns of ships would be coming up the strait.  These reports were relayed to Captain Coward's destroyers.  The enemy was only 30NM south of his patrol line.  An "anvil" attack was planned, splitting his main body group into two smaller groups consisting of USS McDermut and USS Monssen, with Commander R. Phillips of Destroyer Division 108 as Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), and USS Remey, USS McGowan, and USS Melvin with Captain Coward as OTC.  Two destroyers remained on station, patrolling the line between Desolation Point and Homonhan Island.  Captain Coward's two destroyer groups would proceed independently, Commander Phillips to the west, Captain Coward to the east.  Both groups were ordered conduct offensive operations using torpedoes attacks outside of gunfire range of enemy ships and withhold five inch fire, as not to disclose their positions.  At 0206, Captain Coward ordered the five destroyers to General Quarters (GQ) and proceeded south on course 170 at 20 knots.  The Commanding Officer of USS Monssen passed to his crew: "To all hands.  This is the Captain.  We are going into battle.  I know each of you will do his duty.  I promise you that I will do my duty to you and for our country.  Good luck to you, and may God be with us."¹  At 0240, USS McGowen reported an unknown contact on radar bearing 184 degrees, at 18NM.  The radar contact would be Vice Admiral Nishimura's approaching Force "C" moving at 20 knots.  At 0256, Shigure's lookout would report three contacts at 4.3NM (Captain Coward's western group).  Only a few minutes earlier, at 0250, Captain Coward turned his column left to course 150 degrees in order to obtain a better target angle.  Commander Phillips continued south, hugging the coast of Leyte in an effort to prevent detection and would alter course at the last minute to obtain an angle on the bow of 50 degrees at 7500 yards.  Captain Coward steamed straight down the middle of the channel and would turn his column in three successive movements to course 120 before launching torpedoes.  At 0257, Captain Coward passed target assignments, he would take lead target, the other two destroyers of his section would attack target two, while Commander Phillips would take target number three as well as the smaller target.  At 0258, lookouts from destroyer USS Melvin sighted the approaching Japanese ships at a range of approximately 12,800 yards.  Immediately Captain Coward ordered all three destroyers in the eastern group to make smoke and turned his column left, as planned.  At 30 seconds past 0300, USS Remey, USS McGowan, and USS Melvin opened fire with torpedoes against the advancing Japanese column at a range of 8,200 to 9,300 yards.  Over the span of 75 seconds, 27 torpedoes were fired by the three destroyers and Captain Coward turned to 021 degrees, retiring under smoke and zigzagging independently.  All three destroyers came under fire from Yamashiro, but with a tactical speed advantage all three destroyers retired out of gunfire range without a single hit against them.  No evasive action was taken by Vice Admiral Nishimura and between 0308 and 0309, between two and five explosions were sighted by Captain Coward's destroyers with the largest ship, Fuso, slowing and sheering to starboard - hit by a torpedo from USS Melvin.  USS McDermut and USS Monssen continued south and at 0308 turned to put the enemy 50 degrees on the bow for torpedo firing.  Upon making the turn to starboard, USS Monssen came under heavy enemy fire.  Commander Bergin, Commanding Officer of USS Monssen, turned his destroyer hard left to assume position on USS McDermut's port quarter as not to either be blanketed or delayed at the torpedo firing point but this tactic closed the enemy position.  At 0309, both destroyers turned south and Commander Phillips passed the order to fire torpedoes.  Almost immediately USS McDermut began launching and at 0311, USS Monssen launched.  This time Vice Admiral Nishimura did take evasive action, but his change in course actually turned his column into the approaching torpedoes.  At 0320, the flashes of explosions were seen on Yamagumo (which exploded and sunk), Michishio (put in a sinking condition), and Asagumo (bow was blown off) - all accredited to USS McDermut.  USS Monssen would score a hit on battleship Yamashiro but failed to inflict any significant damage.  Both destroyers turned west in an effort to use the Leyte coastline to mask their retirement.  Upon turning, USS McDermut sight two PT boats and promptly turned north, warning the boats twice not to fire.  A curious green flare was dropped over the Leyte coast illuminating both retiring destroyers and each made smoke and zigzagged out of harms way.  Vice Admiral Nishimura passed the disabled hulks of Michishio and Asagumo and passed the following radio dispatch to Admirals Kurita and Shima at 0330:  "Urgent Battle Report Number 2.  Enemy torpedo boats and destroyers present on both sides of northern entrance to Surigao Strait.  Two of our destroyers torpedoed and drifting.  Yamashiro sustained one torpedo hit but no impediment to battle cruising."²

Destroyer Squadrons Twenty-four and Fifty-six

CDS 24 and 56 torpedo attacks,

from Morison History of Navy

Ops in WWII, pg 219

At 0319, Captain McManus commanding Destroyer Squadron 24 on the right flank, closed for the attack.  Earlier, at 0254, as Captain Coward and Commander Phillips groups were dashing to the attack, Rear Admiral Berkey sent a radio message to Captain McManus with orders to divide into two groups and gave specific battle ingress and egress instructions.  Captain McManus's pennant flew from USS Hutchins, a 2,100 ton destroyer that was the first of her class to be outfitted with a Combat Information Center (C.I.C.).  This new C.I.C. provided a fused plot of gunnery, torpedo, and ship movement plot information that allowed the embarked commander (Captain McManus) the best possible presentation of the overall battle space in order to make decisions.  In fact, Captain McManus, fought from C.I.C. vice the traditional location of the commander on the bridge of the ship.  Destroyer Squadron 24 steamed south in two groups, the first consisting of USS Hutchins, USS Daly, and USS Bache, and the second consisted of H.M.A.S. Arunta, USS Killen, and USS Beale.  The second section was commanded by Commander A. Buchanan of the Royal Australian Navy as OTC in H.M.A.S. Arunta.  The previous mentioned explosion of Yamagumo, at 0320, at the hands of a torpedo from USS McDermut provided illumination for Commander Buchanan's attack.  At 0323, H.M.A.S. Arunta fired four torpedoes at Shigure, leading the column, from a range of 6,500 yards - all missed.  At 0325, USS Killen launched five torpedoes at Yamashiro at a range of 8,700 yards with one hit that slowed Yamashiro temporarily to 5 knots.  Within 15 seconds, five more torpedoes were launched by USS Beale aimed at Yamashiro - all missed.  Captain McManus's section closed south at 25 knots to a point off of Amagusan Point, reversed his course and fired a spread of 15 torpedoes between 0329 and 0336, at ranges from 8,200 to 10,700 yards.  At 0340, all three of Captain McManus's destroyers commenced gunfire on the retiring Michishio and Asagumo.  Destroyers USS Hutchins, USS Daly, and USS Bache were evading enemy fire for nearly 12 minutes since firing their torpedoes when three explosions were heard and orange flames were seen, probably the Fuso blowing into two sections which drifted southward, the bow eventually sinking approximately 0420 and the stern within an hour.  Captain McManus turned his destroyers to continue attacks on the fleeing ships that turned south, when Rear Admiral Berkey passed a radio message at 0349 ordering all Destroyer Squadron 24 ships to "knock it off" and retire.  At 0350, while turning to retire, USS Hutchins fired another spread of five torpedoes in the direction of Asagumo.  Asagumo had changed course and Michishio, badly damaged, drifted into the path of the torpedoes and at 0358 she took all five torpedoes squarely, blew up, and sank immediately.  Rear Admiral Oldendorf then threw Captain Smoot and Destroyer Squadron 56 into the action.  Splitting the squadron in three groups, Section 1 consisting of USS Albert W. Grant, USS Richard P. Leary, and USS Newcomb, under the command of Captain Smoot, while Section 2 was made up of, USS Bryant, USS Halford, and USS Robinson, under the command of Captain Conley, and finally Section 3, USS Bennion, USS Leutze, and USS Heywood L. Edwards, under the command of Commander Boulware.  All three sections turned south in column and sped at 25 knots, assuming positions on the bow of the approaching ships.  At 0345, Section 2 was spotted by enemy lookouts and Captain Conley's section came under fire.  Between 0354 and 0359, Section 2 fired five torpedoes at ranges from 8,380 to 9,000 yards - all missed, and Section 2 retired in the vicinity of Hibuson Island.  Section 3 closed and opened fire between 0357 and 0359 at ranges from 7,800 to 8,000 yards at targets of Shigure and Yamashiro.  Both enemy ships made drastic turns to evade the approaching torpedoes - all torpedoes missed, and both enemy ships took Section 3 under fire.  Section 3 was then retiring while making smoke and no enemy salvoes hit their targets.  Section 3 retired toward Leyte and hugged the coastline heading north.  Section 1 was bearing down the middle of the strait and having trouble deconflicting the radar picture.  Yamashiro slowed and turned to the west and Captain Smoot ordered a starboard turn to parallel the battleships course.  At 0404, Captain Smoot ordered torpedo launch, USS Richard P. Leary fired 3, USS Newcomb, and USS Albert W. Grant both fired five each at ranges approximately 6,200 yards from the target.  Two large explosions were registered on Yamashiro at 30 seconds past 0411.  Captain Smoot had already ordered retirement to the north as the main gunfire was already raining all around his ships from the battleships and cruisers on the battle line to the north.  At 0407, while dashing north, destroyer USS Albert W. Grant came under heavy fire and, as she was hit, fired all remaining torpedoes squarely at the enemy.  She would absorb 18 shells, 11 of which were 6 inch shells from friendly cruisers.  At 0420, she lay dead in the water, 34 officers and enlisted men killed or missing and 94 wounded.  USS Newcomb lashed herself to the disable destroyer and hauled her clear - she was repaired and would return to fight in the battle for Okinawa.

Battleships and Cruisers

Battle Line disposition, from                                                 Major Gunfire Phase, from                                               Battle Overview, from

Morison History of Navy Ops                                             Morison History of Navy Ops                                  Humble Battleships and Battlecruisers

in WWII, pg 200                                                                             in WWII, pg 225                                                                   pg. 171

Three additional sections were still patrolling to the north, making east west runs northwest of Hibuson Island.  The first section, stationed on the right flank, was Rear Admiral Berkey with the two light cruisers USS Boise, USS Phoenix, and H.M.A.S. Shropshire.  Approximately six miles to Berkey's east was the group commanded by Rear Admiral Oldendorf of USS Louisville, USS Portland, USS Minneapolis, USS Denver, and USS Columbia.  Still four miles further north was the main Battle Line, commanded by Rear Admiral Weyler, with the battleships USS Mississippi, USS California, USS Tennessee, USS West Virginia, USS Maryland, and USS Pennsylvania.  At 0323, range to the approaching enemy ships was 33,000 yards, Admiral Weyler sent a radio message to the Battle Line ordering them to open fire when ranges were 26,000 yards.  At 0351, Admiral Oldendorf ordered all cruisers of the Right Flank to open fire with USS Louisville ranging the targets at 15,600 yards.  At 0353 the Battle Line added to the fire power bearing down on Yamashiro, Shigure, and Mogami.  Vice Admiral Nishimura, from his flagship Yamashiro, would send a radio message to Fuso to make best speed, not knowing that Fuso had broken in two, was drifting south, and would sink within the hour.  USS West Virginia, USS Tennessee, and USS California were all outfitted with the latest, cutting edge, fire control radar sets and would have fire control solutions passed to main battery plot long before the enemy came within range.  At 0353, USS West Virginia would open fire raining down 93 rounds of 16 inch armor piercing projectiles before checking fire.  Within two minutes, USS Tennessee and USS California opened concentrated fire in six gun salvoes and would fire 63 and 69 rounds respectively.  The other three battleships had older fire control systems and would have trouble ranging the targets.  USS Maryland, however, would fire 48 rounds commencing at 0359, walking her rounds on target using spotter information from splashes from USS West Virginia's fall of shot.  USS Mississippi would fire but a single salvo on target information, and USS Pennsylvania never managed to get a fire control solution and wouldn't fire a single round.  As the Battle Line turned to a westerly course, USS Mississippi fired a full salvo in the direction of the enemy - noted that they may have been clearing their main batteries at the moment when Rear Admiral Oldendorf had ordered Cease Fire.  At 0351, the Left Flank cruiser USS Denver, opened fire and within a minute was followed by rounds from USS Minneapolis, USS Columbia, and USS Portland, all ships pouring gunfire on Yamashiro.  At 0358, USS Portland shifted fire to Mogami, who was attempting to retire south.  At the same time, USS Denver, shifted fire to Shigure, but probably was responsible for rounds that hit USS Albert W. Grant.  USS Louisville also fired rounds at USS Albert W. Grant, but luckily missed.  At 0353, USS Boise shifted firing rate to rapid and continuous on Yamashiro, while USS Phoenix fired 15 gun salvoes at quarter minute intervals on the same target.  Rear Admiral Berkey then ordered USS Boise to slow her rate of fire in order to conserve ammunition.  H.M.A.S. Shropshire was having trouble with her fire control system and didn't open up with 8 inch fire until 0356, and while the formation made their turn to a westerly course, shifted firing rate to rapid and continuous and was joined by the remaining formation cruisers at 0400.    All three groups continued fire and as the allied groups closed range to each other and the enemy the rounds landed with increasing accuracy.  Yamashiro had, at this point, changed course from north to west by south.  Heavy cruiser Mogami had turned south to retire, while destroyer Shigure sheered east near Hibuson Island and surprisingly only suffered one hit, an 8 inch shell that failed to explode.  At 0409, Rear Admiral Oldendorf received the message that USS Albert W. Grant was taking friendly fire and radioed all ships to Cease Fire.  At 0419, Yamashiro would capsize taking Vice Admiral Nishimura with her, at latitude 10 degrees 22.3 minutes north - longitude 125 degrees 21.3 minutes east.   Heavy cruiser Mogami had taken an incredible number of hits and was making smoke and retiring south when, at 0402, a salvo from USS Portland exploded on her bridge killing her Commanding Officer, Captain R. Tooma, as well as her Executive Officer - she slowed to bare steerageway.

Second Striking Force

Track of Vice Admiral Shima's

Navy Ops in WWII, pg 231

Vice Admiral Shima's force of heavy cruisers Nachi, and Ashigara, light cruiser Abukuma, and destroyers Akebono, Ushio, Kasumi, Shiranuhi, Wakaba, Hatsushimo, and Hatsuharu entered the action at 0315, when passing through a rain squall, they were fired upon by PT-134 off of Binit Point, Panoan - all torpedoes missed their target.  At 0320, Vice Admiral Shima ordered his formation east to clear Binit Point.  At 0325, as the formation was still on their easterly course, Abukuma suffered a torpedo hit on her port side from PT-137.  PT-137 was actually targeting a destroyer taking station in the rear of the formation, the torpedoes missed their intended target and slammed into Abukuma, killing 30 men and slowing the cruiser to 10 knots.  Vice Admiral Shima then turned his disposition north, and at 0410 encountered the burning hulk of Fuso in two pieces.  Vice Admiral Shima's force detected targets to the northeast and prepared for torpedo attack, firing at 0424 at a range of 9,000 yards - all torpedoes missed their targets and two torpedoes were later recovered after beaching on Hibuson Island.  At 0425, Vice Admiral Shima recalled his force and turned south, passing a radio message Vice Admiral Mikawa informing him of the conclusion of present action and retirement for planning of further attacks.  While transiting south, heavy cruiser Nachi encountered the disabled Mogami and believed her to be dead in the water and, in an inexplicable display of poor seamanship, failed to avoid her and both cruisers collided at 0430.  Mogami would fall into the column heading south and run afoul of Motor Torpedo Boat Section 11, attacking and causing slight damage to PT-321.

Post-battle Pursuit

At 0433, Rear Admiral Oldendorf ordered dashed in pursuit with USS Louisville down the middle of the strait screened by Destroyer Squadron 56, followed by the remainder of the Left Flank cruisers in column.  He then ordered the Right Flank cruisers to start south along the Leyte coastline and detached the Battle Line screen of Division X-ray to take up pursuit duties.  At 0535, X-ray caught up with the Left Flank cruisers and were ordered to join their formation.  At a few minutes after 0500, USS Louisville detected enemy ships again heading north in the vicinity of Amagusan Point, but within a few minutes Vice Admiral Shima changed course again south and continued retirement.  At 0520, Rear Admiral Oldendorf's cruisers were eight miles off of Eschonchada Point and he swung the formation to 250 degrees and verified that the one contact he had on radar was indeed the enemy.  Mogami was the target and she came under intense fire from USS Louisville, USS Portland, and USS Denver.  Rear Admiral Oldendorf turned his cruisers north at 0537 to reconcentrate his force to the north leaving Mogami to burn.  Mogami would again come under attack at 0600, this time from PT-491 firing two torpedoes - both missed, Mogami countering with a valiant barrage of 8 inch gunfire.  Vice Admiral Shima's column was detected by PT-190 at 0630, but chased away by destroyers took refuge by making smoke and escaped into Sogod Bay.  Vice Admiral Shima ordered his disposition to close Mindanao and made for 16 knots cruising speed to avoid further encounters with the Motor Torpedo Boat sections.  At 0645, Mogami again found a PT boat, this time PT-137 who gave chase but due to the heavy cruisers high speed, secondary battery gunfire, and a screening destroyer, was forced to retire.  Rear Admiral Oldendorf had again turned south at 0643, directing Rear Admiral Hayler to take his two light cruisers and three destroyers and neutralize any remaining disabled enemy ships he could find.  Cruisers USS Denver and USS Columbia joined gunfire from USS Cony and USS Sigourney, from Division X-ray, on Asagumo - all five opening fire at 0707.  Asagumo was badly damaged by Destroyer Squadron 54, blowing Asagumo's bow off.  She continued firing from her aft gun mount, her last salvo fired as the stern went down at 0721 halfway between Tungo Point, Dinagat and Caligangan Point, Panaon.  At 0845, Rear Admiral Sprague's carrier launched Avengers found Vice Admiral Shima's fleeing force and swooped in for attack on Mogami and at 0910 left her dead in the water.  Destroyer Akebono took off Mogami's crew, but met the same fate at 1230 by the hand of a torpedo attack.  Cruiser Abukuma and destroyer Ushio would put in at Dapitan on the northwest point of Mindanao, upon leaving port on the morning of 26 October, at 1006 were attacked 44 B-24's and B-25's of the V and XIII Army Air Force and Abukuma sunk near Negros at 1242.  Nachi proceeded to Manila Bay and would be sunk by Helldivers and Avengers from USS Lexington on November 5, 1944.  Thus the only units to escape were Ashigara, and five destroyers.

¹History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 12, Leyte, p. 213

²History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 12, Leyte, p. 217, cited from War College Analysis V 206, quoting WDC 161,005.

Updated:  12/05/02, HOME
Chris England