Narrative:

     Japanese Naval and General Staffs had been working on tentative plans for war with the Western powers since January of 1941, well before the U.S. government banned trade with them in the summer of 1941.  Japanese strategists knew that their country could not maintain a prolonged offensive at that point in time.  Her merchant fleet was small and the industrial capacity of Japan was much smaller than America's and Great Britain's.  The capture of raw materials such as oil, rubber, tin and bauxite needed to be done early and quickly or else Japan would face an enormous handicap.  South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific regions were producing about 91% of the world's natural rubber, about 58% of the world's tin and around 5% of the world's bauxite.  In terms of oil, Japan targeted Borneo, Java and Sumatra, who produced annually about 1.8 times Japan's estimated requirement of oil in an average year of war.  Getting the oilfields and refineries of Java and Sumatra would be key, as well as, result in direct conflict with Western powers.
     The Japanese plan called for the defeat of the British and American forces in Malaya and the Philippines.  They needed to get rid of the British outpost at Hong Kong and seize British Borneo.  Flanking positions in the Bismarck Archipelago and south Burma needed to be set up.  Then, armies would converge on the Netherlands East Indies by using the South China Sea, the Makassar Strait and the Molucca Passage.  Finally, by occupying Burma and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Japan would place forces in a perimeter extending south-eastwards from the Kurile Islands to the Gilbert Islands.  Then westwards through the Solomons and New Guinea to Christmas Island, and across the Indian Ocean to the frontier between India and Burma.  Japan's hope was that if this line could be reached and occupied in strength, then the Western powers would concede Japan's claim to a dominant position in the Far East.  Although Western territories would be lost, Japan hoped that the time and expense of reconquering these distant territories would be seen as too troublesome to the Western powers.
     The Japanese Army could spare only 11 divisions and around 700 aircraft towards their plan.  40 divisions and 800 aircraft were needed for the defense of Japan, Korea, Manchuria and occupied China.  Because of this, the Japanese would need to configure their plan so that forces used to capture Hong Kong and the Philippines could later be used for operations against the Netherlans East Indies.  The navy was able to devote about 500 aircraft for support of land operations, but they did not want to engage in a straight fight with the U.S. Pacific Fleet.  Japan's surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet called for the 6 fastest carriers with 432 aircraft, 9 destroyers, 1 light cruiser, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers and 3 submarines.  The naval force was to move east from the Kurile Islands to Midway Island, then go south-east towards the Hawaiian Isalnds in order to be not seen.

Map of Pacific Area

photo from CMH at UT

     In January of 1942 Japan seized the city of Rabaul on the island of New Britain from the Australians, Kavieng on New Ireland and Gasmata on the south coast of New Britain.  These three cities were to be used as bases for the invasion of New Guinea.  Forces from Gasmata began the assault on New Guinea in February.  They captured the cities of Salamaua, Lae and Finschhafen.  Preparations were being made for an attack on Port Moresby in southern Papua when the Japanese received word that American forces had bombed Tokyo.


Map of New Guinea

photo from CMH at UT


     As a result of the setbacks in the Coral Sea and Midway Island, the Japanese postponed the invasion of Port Moresby.  A decision was made to try to take Port Moresby by an overland advance from the north coast of New Guinea.  On July 21 troops from the Japanese 17th Army began to land at Buna, on the north coast of New Guinea.  They were to cross the Stanley Owen Mountains in order to get to Port Moresby.  The Japanese reached and occupied Kokoda on July 29 and through the control of the Bismarck Sea were able to raise their strength to about 13,500 men.  The troops did little to help against repeated Allied bomber attacks that broke down the Japanese line of communications.  General Douglas MacArthur, who in command of all land and army forces in the Philippines, New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, Australia and most of Indonesia, ordered the 18th Australian Brigade to Milne Bay and the 21st Australian Brigade to Port Moresby.  General Sir John Blamey of Australia took control of the operations in New Guinea on September 23.  He began to drive the Japanese back along the Kokoda trail.  After entering the city of Kokoda, the Australians forced the Japanese to retreat from Templeton's Crossing to the west bank of the Kumusi river and then to the east bank with help from air support.  After crossing the Kumusi River, the Australians built airfields near Gona and Sonananda which made it possible for artillery and supplies to be flown to the forward area.


Kokoda Trail Map

photo from ww2database


Meanwhile the 128th U.S. Infantry Regiment, along with an Australian battalion, moved towards Pongani.  In November the 126th and 127th Infantry Regiments, along with the 6th Australian Division joined the march.  Lt. Gen. R.L. Eichelberger took charge of the American troops with orders from MacArthur to, "take Buna or not come back alive".  Gona was captured by the 21st Australian Brigade on December 9 but progress on the other targets moved slowly.  Weather, disease and battle casaulties slowed the Allies movements.  Sanananda and Buna were finally taken by January 21.  The Australians had lost close to 5,700 men and the Americans about 2,800 since July.  Japanese losses are not precisely known, but it is believed to have been around 12,000 men.
     Next, the Allied forces prepared to drive the Japanese from Lae and Salamaua.  These cities are located on the Huon peninsula which was to be used as a starting point for the capture of Rabaul.  The Australians were able to push the Japanese north, towards the coast.  The Japanese decided to reinforce the garrison of Lae with the 51st Division, which was in Rabaul.  The reinforcements were to be brought over by eight transports escorted by eight destroyers.  Allied reconnaissance aircraft spotted the convoy and between March 2 and 5 American and Australian bombers sank all the transports and half the destroyers.


Eastern New Guinea
image from Collier, B.


     For MacArthur's advance into Dutch New Guinea (western New Guinea), he would rely mostly on General Krueger's Sixth Army.  Hollandia was  chosen as the first target.  Located next to Humboldt Bay, Hollandia would be used as a base for Allied naval, air and land forces.  With nearly 50,000 troops at MacArthur's disposal, Hollandia and most of the surrounding areas were taken with relative ease.  The capture of Hollandia was key to the Allies because the Japanese had 3 airfields about 10 miles west of the city and were in the process of building a fourth.  Late in July of 1944 the city of Sansapor was taken without opposition, which was the last of MacArthur's objectives in New Guinea.  MacArthur's advance along the north coast of New Guinea ended with the capture of every important base except for one at Wewak.
western New Guinea
image from Collier, B.