Cross-Channel Invasion
Early Plans
The earliest mention of a cross-channel attack occurs in a letter from Churchill to FDR dated April 17, 1942. His letter began with an enthusiastic tone, then backed off. Churchill wanted to avoid a direct discussion of the issue, although in the fall of 1942, he opposed the invasion, codenamed Sledgehammer. (9)
Sledgehammer was developed by the U.S. Army to be an emergency, small scale operation in 1942 that would be executed only if the German army seemed to be winning on the Eastern Front. (10) During talks at Hyde Park with Churchll during late June 1942, FDR made assurances to Churchill that he was committed to a cross-channel invasion to occur in 1943. Churchill pointed out the shortcomings of launching a cross-channel invasion in September of 1942. He believed that the operation was "certain to lead to disaster" and would not aid the Russians, would make French supporters vulnerable to the Nazis, and would delay the main operation that was to occur in 1943 on the continent. However, with no workable plan for American entrance into the Atlantic Theater, Churchill questioned, "Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic theatre during the whole of 1942? Ought not be preparing the general structure of BOLERO [the buildup for a cross-channel assault] some other operation by which we could take some weight off Russia?" However, Churchill and the British Cabinet witheld their opposition from the Americans during talks regarding military strategy, the Marshall-Hopkins talks. (11)
FDR sent Hopkins and Marshall to the London Conference in July 1942 with very detailed instructions. He desired an agreement with the British that would nail down the plans for 1942 and create "tenative" plans for 1943. He also wanted to see U.S. forces engaged in ground operations in 1942, preferrably in France. FDR sought to retain the Europe First focus becuase he believed that "Japanese defeat would not overcome Germany, but German defeat would mean victory over Japan." After a week of negotiations, FDR was finally pleased with the hard won agreement. He appreciated that the issue of when and where U.S. ground troops would be engaged was left open and was therefore flexible. (12) Although the Americans did not know it right away, the Marshall-Hopkins talks were a disaster. Churchill and his staff opposed both the plan for an Ango-American invasion (Sledgehammer) and the plan for a cross-channel invasion (Roundup). They believed the Anglo-American invasion would be more Anglo than American and they were not moved by Marshall's arguments for the massive invasion called for by Roundup. One negotiator, Pug Ismay stated, "Our American friends went home happily under the impression that we had committed ourselves to both Roundup and Sledgehammer...When we had to tell them...that we were were absolutely opposed to it [Sledgehammer] they felt we had broken faith with them." Churchill even admitted the "lack of candor" used by the British. (13)
In the letter above, FDR informs Churchill that Hopkins and Marshall are leaving for London. He also mentions speaking to Stalin about sending two representatives to Washington. FDR would now have to deal with the Soviets regarding the European Attack. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill. (NLR-MR-FDRWSC-1942-14L1) on April 1, 1942 from NAIL Database
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FDR sent Hopkins and Marshall to the London Conference in July 1942 with very detailed instructions. He desired an agreement with the British that would nail down the plans for 1942 and create "tenative" plans for 1943. He also wanted to see U.S. forces engaged in ground operations in 1942, preferrably in France. FDR sought to retain the Europe First focus becuase he believed that "Japanese defeat would not overcome Germany, but German defeat would mean victory over Japan." After a week of negotiations, FDR was finally pleased with the hard won agreement. He appreciated that the issue of when and where U.S. ground troops would be engaged was left open and was therefore flexible. (12) Although the Americans did not know it right away, the Marshall-Hopkins talks were a disaster. Churchill and his staff opposed both the plan for an Ango-American invasion (Sledgehammer) and the plan for a cross-channel invasion (Roundup). They believed the Anglo-American invasion would be more Anglo than American and they were not moved by Marshall's arguments for the massive invasion called for by Roundup. One negotiator, Pug Ismay stated, "Our American friends went home happily under the impression that we had committed ourselves to both Roundup and Sledgehammer...When we had to tell them...that we were were absolutely opposed to it [Sledgehammer] they felt we had broken faith with them." Churchill even admitted the "lack of candor" used by the British. (13)