Interpretations of the Causes

A. J. P. Taylor followed the traditional interpretation of the cause of the war that blamed Germany. Bismarck had dismissed the Balkans as "not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier" at the Berlin Congress of 1878, and preferred a diplomacy that preserved the balance of power in Europe to give Germany the opportunity to grow strong. Ironically, the growth of Germany upset the balance of power, gave Kaiser Wilhelm visions of military grandeur, and caused other countries to militarize and create elaborate railroad schedules to stop Germany. The "war by timetable" put events beyond the control of anyone to stop it. According to Fritz Fischer, German elites planned to start a war in 1912 after the Social Democratic party in the Reichstag pushed through social reforms. Fischer's argument meant there was a continuity to German policy from 1914 to 1939, both the Kaiser and Hitler saw militarism as a conservative defense against liberalism and socialism. Fischer argued that in July 1914, Germany manipulated Austria-Hungary into starting the war. Niall Ferguson put the blame on Sir Edward Grey and England, who started the war for their own political survival, and misread Germany's intentions. According to Ferguson, Europe was not a "powder keg" of militarism and imperialism that made war inevitable. Rather, it was the mistaken policy of British leaders. David Stevenson argues that the war was the result of rational choices made by the leaders of many countries to gain some advantage by a quick war. The result of these choices, however, were unforeseen and bloody and tragic. John Keegan and Hew Strachan argue the war was not due to the choices or mistakes of a few leaders such as the Kaiser or Sir Grey. Rather, it was an inevitable consequence of militarism, and was global in scope rather than only a series of bloody battles on the Western Front.

Sources:

• Ferguson, Niall. The Pity of War. London: Penguin Press, 1998. 623 p.
• Fischer, Fritz. Germany's Aims in the First World War. New York: Norton, 1961. 652 p.
• Keegan, John. The First World War. New York : A. Knopf, 1999.
• Lafore, Laurence D. The Long Fuse: an Interpretation of the Origins of World War I. 2nd ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1997. 284 p.
• Stevenson, David. Cataclysm: the First World War as Political Tragedy. New York : Basic Books, 2004. 564 p.
• Strachan, Hew. The First World War: To Arms. Vol 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 1180 p.
• Taylor, A. J. P. War by Time-table: How the First World War Began. London, Macdonald & Co., 1969. 128 p.

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